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INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the debate over the individual right to possess firearms
has focused on the origins and meaning of the Second Amendment. 1
Some constitutional scholars have dismissed the idea that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to arms. They argue that it only
prevents the federal government from disarming states. 2 Other scholars,

1. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. See, Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 206 (1983) [hereinafter Kates, Original
Meaning]. Kates cites a number of articles written in the past several years endorsing the
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focusing on the language of the amendment and its historical context,
conclude that it does indeed establish an individual right to firearms.
This article examines whether, even absent the Second Amendment, the
Constitution restrains government from taking away what may be
individuals' best tools of self-defense. The foothold for the analysis is
3
the controversial Ninth Amendment.
Predominantly, I will use principles that can be gleaned from the
models offered for invigorating the Ninth Amendment to expose the
array of difficult questions we must face before disarming citizens. In
exploring these questions I will suggest that we can indeed derive an
individual right to arms from the Ninth Amendment and are required to
abandon some basic beliefs about our Constitution and the role of
government if we deny the existence of that right. I also will suggest
that abandoning those principles here makes advocacy of other Ninth
Amendment rights highly problematic. 4 In a smaller way, I hope to
respond to the call to open the debate over individual firearms to
frequently discounted voices. 5 I will assume as an opposing position the
alternative to general disarmament. 6
idea that the Second Amendment was designed to protect states' rights to arms against
infringement by the federal government. Id. at 207 n.13.
In a subsequent article, Kates notes that there may be more articles favoring the
individual right view of the Amendment, but the states' right view has dominated legal
circles because of its adoption by organizations like the American Bar Association and the
American Civil Liberties Union. Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue,
49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 144 n.7 (1986) [hereinafter Kates, Dialogue].
Professor Sanford Levinson comments, "[t]o put it mildly, the Second Amendment is
not at the forefront of constitutional discussion, at least as registered in what the academy
regards as the venues for such discussions ....
[One leading constitutional scholar] has
recently written 'the Second Amendment is not taken seriously by most scholars."'
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 639 (1989).
3. "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
4. For instance, the Ninth Amendment has been suggested as a basis for a right to
welfare benefits from the state. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
5. See Levinson, supra note 2.
6. It might be argued that this aim is not taken seriously in the current debate.
Whether that is true or not, there plainly are large numbers of individuals in our society
who believe that is the aim. See, e.g., Brady Bill Vote In House Emboldens Anti-Gunners,
AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1991, at 61 (Reporting "Brady Bill" sponsor Edward Feighan's
statement on ABC T.V.'s "Nightline" that his camp was "forced to overstate what we can
get from the Brady bill," which was only as "first step" to be followed by action on "other
dimensions" of the gun problem. Also citing Rep. William Clay, who stated that the
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II. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AS A MEANINGFUL CONSTITUTIONAL
GUIDEPOST

Recent Ninth Amendment literature yields two notable models for
understanding and construing it.7 The predominant one, which I have
labeled the "deep structures" model, focuses on broad constitutional
values and the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy.
The second model, used on a more limited basis, stems from a
'8
framework of "natural rights."
The deep structures model contains an array of approaches, whose
nebulous and flexible standards are similar to those the Supreme Court
has used both in incorporating parts of the Bill of Rights as restrictions
on state action and in establishing unenumerated rights without
explicitly invoking the Ninth Amendment. 9 These approaches suggest
that unenumerated rights arise on their own merits through an
examination of their fit with, and necessity to, the functioning of our
constitutional structure.
One rendition of the deep structures model posits that the Supreme
Court might derive specific rights from the Ninth Amendment by
starting "with the strong historical argument that [the amendment was]
intended to apply in a situation where the asserted right appears to the

Brady Bill was a "minimum step. We need much stricter gun control, and eventually we
should bar the ownership of handguns except in a few cases."); Larry Pratt, America's Top
Ten Gun Grabbers,GUNS & AMMO, July 1991, at 24 (Pete Shields, Chairman Emeritus,
Handgun Control Inc., stated, "[w]e are going to have to take one step at a time, and the
first step is-given the political realities-going to be very modest . . . . The final
problem is to make the possession of all handguns [with limited exceptions] totally
illegal."). See also H.R.J. Res. 438, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposing repeal of
the Second Amendment); S. 2913, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (banning the possession
of handguns).
7. Notwithstanding its underutilization, the Ninth Amendment periodically has been
construed to establish substantive individual rights. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 237 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
8. See infra notes 199-213 for a discussion of the second model.
9. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (describing the standard for
incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment as a
limit on state action); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and
Constitutional Legitimacy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37, 57-58 (1988) (citing the Court's list
of 13 unenumerated rights.)
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Court as fundamental to a free society.... [T]he textual standard should
10
be the entire Constitution."
One commentator offers an open-ended test of "reasonableness":
[Other commentators] err in thinking constitutional theory should look for
ways to close the ninth amendment and other open-ended provisions by
identifying "sources" to which judges and others can go to locate rights
for application in concrete cases ....
Applying some meaningful test of reasonableness would find judges
and others conducting case-by-case review of legislation in changing
circumstances. For the reasonableness of measures is a contextual matter.
Because we cannot control the future, we cannot know in advance of
particular circumstances where the harm visited by government on some
individual or minority would be justified by a credible view of the
common good within the system's capacities. Thus, a reasonableness test
is incorrigibly open-ended. And the right to be harmed only by
governmental acts that are reasonable by some honest test is the least of
the protections we could expect under the ninth amendment.1 1

Another approach is less supportive of the direct substantive value
of the Ninth Amendment, relying instead on the historical context of the
Bill of Rights.
With or without the Ninth Amendment, we would have to approach the
task of constitutional interpretation with some basic understanding of the
sources from which the document derives (i.e., both the history of the
American Revolution and the liberal and republican philosophies which
had inspired the founders), its overall purpose and design (i.e., the
political philosophy of the founding generation), and its views of the
relation of the government to the individual (i.e., a more general
philosophical view of the meaning of life and the place of the political
12
community within it).

Sanford Levinson suggests that our understanding of the Ninth
Amendment might grow from:

10. Norman Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained By the People"? 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 808, 810 (1962).
11. Sotirios A. Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to
Crack?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67, 80-81 (1988).
12. Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution:
The Problems of Constitutional Interpretation,64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 204 (1988).
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close attention to the narratives by which we constitute our own
particularistic way of life. Such listening-and the careful interpretation
of what we hear will enable us to grasp the deep structures that constitute
our political order and to understand as well that some transitory political
notions, even when embodied in legislation, could be in serious conflict
with these structures. 13
14
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut
offers one of the most extensive treatments of the Ninth Amendment in
a Supreme Court case. It suggests that judges might derive rights from
the Ninth Amendment by looking to "the traditions and conscience of
our people [to determine whether a principle is so rooted] as to be
ranked as fundamental." 15 Such a fundamental right, which cannot be
denied, is one which "lie[s] at the base of all our civil and political
16
institutions."
Taken together, these approaches prompt us to question whether our
beliefs and convictions about core constitutional concerns permit us to
take the steps we must take and believe the things we must believe in
order to prohibit individual possession of firearms for self-defense.

III.

A Focus ON INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENSE

The central question in this article is whether the interest of
individual citizens in protecting their own lives from physical threats,
collective and political implications aside, establishes a right to possess
weapons that are useful in repelling those threats. 17 The search for an
13.
KENT L.
14.
15.
16.

Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.REV. 131 (1988).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 487 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).

17. One might resist the idea that gun ownership is an essential aspect of human
existence; however, no one in the debate has suggested that those to whom many would
exclusively delegate the function of providing security, police and other government
agents, should proceed disarmed. We generally agree that guns in their hands are useful and
necessary for protecting against and deterring aggression. Once this is conceded, it is no
long stretch to conclude that the essential human interest in physical security includes an
individual interest in possessing mechanisms that are highly useful in resisting or
repelling violent threats. Guns must be central on any such list. The traditional debate
over the place of collective use of privately held arms as instruments affecting collective
interests and the operation of government, together with the arcane image of militia men
drilling in the village green, is largely removed from this analysis.
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answer can begin with the suggestion by positivists that the sum total of
individual rights lies in the language of selected parts of the Bill of
Rights. 18 There are at least two difficulties with the positivists'
approach. First, the Supreme Court already has established
unenumerated rights through strenuous manipulation of the enumerated
guarantees. 19 Second, there plainly are numerous simple acts of
individual autononiy that we undertake daily which are not explicitly
protected by the Bill of Rights. It is troubling to conclude that these acts
are protected only by creative extrapolation of the meager provisions of
the explicit guarantees. It is this range of acts that the Ninth Amendment
might necessarily protect. By comparison, we gain some insight into
whether the Ninth Amendment might accommodate a right to firearms
ownership for individual self-defense.
In the debates over ratification of the Bill of Rights, delegates
commonly objected that it was impossible to list the rights of free men.
Speakers made reference to various common activities, questioning
whether the right to wear the hat of one's choosing would be
guaranteed, whether one could eat at the time one chooses, or whether
one could undertake various other individual activities without
interference from or regulation by government. 20
Ownership of firearms was commonplace during the revolutionary
period. Their use and ownership for many purposes was considered
essential and completely noncontroversial. 21 "Throughout the Colonies,
no implements were more abundant than firearms; none was more in
use, more used up, more in demand. Gunsmiths of Europe flocked to
18. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 11, at 69. Barber's description of Robert Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971), is
instructive.
See also Sotirios A. Barber, The New Right Assault on Moral Inquiry in
Constitutional Law, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253 (1986) (critiquing Bork's
constitutionalism).
19. Barnett, supra note 9, at 53, 54.
20. See, e.g., infra notes 29, 30. In modern jurisprudence, it seems much of our
activity is constitutionally protected only after being forced into the box of speech or
expression, or shoehorned into one of the other explicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
One by-product of this effort, aside from the pulling and stretching of the limited language
of the explicit guarantees, is the danger that the individual decisions we take for granted as
protected may be vulnerable to future restrictions. This danger may be very substantial as
we move into an age where the cumulative impact of virtually any individual activity may
stimulate the cry that the activity must be banned or regulated.
21. CHARLES W. SAWYER, FiREARMs IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29 (1990).
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the Colonies, sure of steady employment at repairing , and making and
selling."' 22 While the concept may be difficult to digest today, "it was
considered normal for eighteenth century civilians to carry pocket
pistols for protection while traveling." 23 "The sense of group selfpreservation and self-defense was strong." 24 Firearms were not only
25
commonplace, but also they were, at times, required to be kept.
Our common law supports an individual right to arms for selfdefense, unimpaired by governmental restrictions. Fourteenth century
English weapons restrictions included explicit exceptions for both self
defense and the defense of one's dwelling. 26 In a detailed examination
of the 1780 Opinion of the Recorder of London on the Scope of the
Right to Have Arms in England, David Caplan shows the Recorder
endorsing unequivocally an individual right to arms for self-defense

22. Id. at 29.
23. GEORGE C. NEUMANN, THE HISTORY OF WEAPONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,

150-51 (1967).
24. Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study In Judicial Misinterpretation,2
WM. & MARY L. REV. 381, 388 (1960).
25. See THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITrEE ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. Doc. No. 2807, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1982). The report stated:
In the colonies, availability of hunting and need for defense led to armament
statutes comparable to those of the early Saxon times. In 1623, Virginia forbade
its colonists to travel unless they were "well armed"; in 1631 it required colonists
to engage in target practice on Sunday and to 'bring their pieces to church.' In
1658, it required every householder to have a functioning firearm within his house
and in 1673 its laws provided that a citizen who claimed he was too poor to
purchase a firearm would have one purchased for him by the government, which
would then. require him to pay a reasonable price when able to do so. In
Massachusetts, the first session of the legislature ordered that not only freemen,
but also indentured servants own firearms and, in 1644, it imposed a stern 6
shilling fine upon any citizen who was not armed.
Id.
26. David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizens Armies: Toward A Jurisprudenceof the
Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 559, 566-67 (1986) [hereinafter Hardy,
Armed Citizens]. Hardy argues in a separate article that the common law recognized an
individual right to arms that was separate from the concept that a militia was an especially
appropriate way of defending a free republic. David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and
the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1, 23 (1987), [hereinafter Hardy,
Historiography].
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"where there is no time to invoke the aid of established authority," but
27
distinguishing unauthorized exercises by assemblies of armed men.
At least one modern writer has moved toward acknowledging this
dichotomy:
The framers do not appear to have distinguished sharply between the
"personal safety" reasons for possessing weapons and the "political
safety" reasons that were at the forefront of the debate that led to the
adoption of the Second Amendment. One likely explanation is that, at the
time of the Amendment's adoption, America retained a predominantly
rural culture with a frontier ethos, and no one had any reason to expect
that a popularly elected government would have any motive to interfere
with its citizens' ability to defend themselves against the hazards of
28
everyday life.

From this perspective, even if we accept the Second Amendment as
protecting only a collective right, it remains possible that an individual
right to arms to repel immediate and proximate threats was considered
by the framers as basic as the right to dress warmly against the cold.
Justice Holmes implicitly accepted some element of this sentiment
in one of the Court's early decisions in this century, Patsone v.
Pennsylvania.29 He concluded that a ban on aliens' possession of long
arms was permissible as a hunting control measure, because the ban did
not extend to handguns, which might be needed "occasionally for selfdefense." This passage appears to recognize some level of individual
interest in arms for self-defense, but it does not explicitly invoke the
Second Amendment.
There was serious debate over whether listing some of the more
abstract constitutional rights was descending into minutia. A good
example is the House debate in the First Congress over the necessity of
a constitutional amendment protecting the right of peaceable assembly.
Ninth Amendment commentator, Charles Cooper, notes the objection
of Congressman Sedgwick of Massachusetts that the right to assembly
was too "self-evident" and "inalienable" to ever be called into question.

27. David I. Caplan, The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial
Trend, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 789, 803 (1982).
28. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty and the Right to SelfPreservation,39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 117 (1987).
29. 232 U.S. 138, 143 (1914).
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Sedgwick contended that a descent into such "minutiae"30would lead to a
trivial and lengthy enumeration of other obvious rights.
A connection exists between individual Americans and arms that
goes deeper than the mere utility of firearms. It appears to be an almost
spiritual attachment. 3 1 Historically, ownership and proficient,
responsible use of firearms were connected directly to the development
of the character and self-discipline that were considered necessary
32
characteristics of citizens in a free society.
Plainly, the framers' attitude about firearms was drastically different
from some we find today. Guns were not considered the embodiment

30. Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth
Amendment's Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & POL. 63 (1987) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS
759 (n.p., J. Gales & W. Seaton eds., 1834)). Cooper has written:
[Tihey might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they might
have declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he
might get up when he pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper; but [I] would
ask the gentleman whether he thought it necessary to enter these trifles in a
declaration of rights, in a Government where none of them were intended to be
infringed.
Id. at 72.
See also Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
1162-63 (1987). Professor Sherry describes the position of many of the original
opponents of a Bill of Rights. Madison entertained the possibility that "an enumeration
which was not complete was not safe." Others argued that it would be impossible to
enumerate every right that citizens held against the federal government. She cites James
Iredell from the North Carolina ratifying convention: "[liet anyone make what collection
or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more
rights not contained in it." Id. (citing 4 The Debates in the Several Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, As Recommended By the General Convention at
Philadelphia, in 1787 167 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836)).
3 1. Don Kates cites historical support for the idea that the founding fathers
expressed "an almost religious quality about the relationship between men and arms."
Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 2, at 229 (citing Ashbury, The Right to Keep and
Bear Arms in America: The Origin and Application of the Second Amendment to the
Constitution (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan)).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 118-28. One relevant and often cited
declaration from Jefferson illustrates the point. In a letter to his fifteen year old nephew
Jefferson advised:
A strong body makes the mind strong. As to the species of exercises, I advise the
gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to the Body, it gives boldness,
enterprise and independence to the mind. Games played with the ball, and others
of that nature, are too violent for the body and stamp no character on the mind. Let
your gun therefore be the constant companion of your walks.
Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 2, at 229 (citing THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA 318
(Foley ed., 1967)).
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of evil with "little, if any, compensating social advantage. ' 33 They were
useful, vital tools as common as any other item manufactured by
craftsmen of the period. Once we recognize this and appreciate that for
many Americans, firearms still are commonplace, useful tools with
unmatched utility for self-defense, we might view possession of arms
for individual defense to be as basic as the right to choose a heavy coat
against the cold. 34 Characterized this way, a right to arms for self
defense might be retrieved from the Ninth Amendment along with the
right to engage in a myriad of other basic human activities.
As a byproduct, this individual defense focus offers a principled
basis for prohibiting access to highly destructive weapons. Prohibitions
might focus on whether the weapon can be discharged in close
proximity without injuring the user and whether it can be operated by a
single individual. If the focus is direct and immediate individual
defense, then we might sensibly differentiate between long-range or
remote delivery weapons of destruction and personal weaponry suitable
for individual self-defense.
It is also possible that a purely self-defense based right to arms
would achieve some of the arguably noble goals of a citizens' militia.
The presence of scores of millions of individual Americans protecting
their private interests undoubtedly would be a daunting prospect for an

33. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 655.
34. Under particularly taxing situations, like the combination of war, natural
disaster, and civic unrest, reasonable people might disagree whether arms in the hands
only of government and acknowledged or aspiring criminals is an advantage or not.
General disarmament could make the maintenance of order by government officials easier,
but such circumstances will yield many victims who pay with their lives for reliance on a
collective security system that under the circumstances is inadequate. See also 10 U.S.C. §
311 (1988) (designating able-bodied citizens as members of the militia, which the statute
considers the only substitute for national defense purposes in the event that organized
armed forces are deployed).
Under the present circumstances, police simply cannot preempt threats to
individuals. A variety of factors, including the size of the jurisdiction, the resources put
into the local police, and, some charge, the socio/economic or racial category of the
victim, influence the amount of time it takes for public security forces to arrive. In a
disarmed society where only criminals and government have guns, peaceable citizens may
encounter more threats, because the aggressors will expect to strike with impunity,
knowing that most of their victims are defenseless. In some portion of those instances,
the defenseless victim will lose his life before he is able to call for help. Even assuming
the police arrive in time, the scenario ignores those in the rural population, whose
neighbors live far enough away that they would not hear cries for help.
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invader or emerging despot to contemplate, especially as compared to
the deterrent value of a disarmed populace.
IV.

CONFLICTING CONSITUTIONAL VISIONS: LOCKEAN AND
CLASSICAL REPUBLICAN

At one level, the controversy over constitutional protection of
individual firearms is a product of conflict between the two primary
views of the roots and purposes of our Constitution and the relationship
between government and individuals. The Classical Republican vision
emphasizes a strong state with a focus on order. The Lockean vision,
influenced by Enlightenment thought, emphasizes individual liberty and
the subordination of the state. 35 Some argue that the Lockean vision
predominantly influenced the framers' views of constitutional
democracy.36

Nonetheless, much of the traditional Second Amendment debate
presumes that Classical Republicanism was the driving force behind the
framers' constitutional vision. 37 Despite the disregard of the Lockean
35. Hardy, Historiography,supra note 26, at 2. These competing visions are
illustrated by David Hardy's notation of the divergent views of John Adams, who was
obsessed with the risk of mob rule, and Thomas Jefferson, who lightly praised the virtues
of frequent revolutions. Id.
36. See Terrence J. Moore, The Ninth Amendment: Its Origins and Meaning, 7 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 215 (1972). Professor Moore draws from the works of a significant number
of constitutional historians, who agree that Locke's political theories formed the
background and foundation for the United States Constitution. Id. at 237-46. This list
includes: CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1922); HUNTINGTON CAIRNS,

LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL (1949); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE HIGHER LAW
BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1961); CHARLES PELHAM CURTIS, LAW AS
LARGE As LIFE: A NATURAL LAW FOR TODAY INTHE SUPREME COURT AS ITS PROPHET (1959);
Russell Kirk, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT
(Gateway Press 1964) (1690); Thomas P. Reardon, ITRODUCrTION to JOHN LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Reardon ed., 1952) (1690); DAVID
GEORGE RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS: A CRITICISM OF SOME POLITICAL AND ETHICAL

CONCEPTIONS (London, Unwin Ltd. 1894). See also Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a
Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of and Understanding of Republicanism in
American Historiography,29 WM. & MARY Q. 50 (1972).
37. The exchange between Professors Levinson and Brown is a model of this
approach. See Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors and Civic
Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 661 (1989); Levinson, supra note 2. Professor Levinson lends some credence to the
idea that an armed citizens' militia can be considered a deterrent to internal despotism or
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vision in Second Amendment debate, it figures prominently in efforts to
revive the Ninth Amendment 38 and sets one on the path to determining
whether individual Americans have the right to own and use guns for
their personal defense and security.
A Lockean focus substantially affects our view about the allocation
and control of tools useful in exercising and resisting power. There is an
inherent tension between the ideas of individual liberty and order
through a strong state. The coexistence of these two forces at the root of
our constitutional system suggests they must exist in some sort of
equilibrium. 39 We should, therefore, be reluctant to eliminate
instruments necessary to the vitality of either of these competing forces.
The question is whether guns in the hands of individual citizens can be
classified among those important instruments.
In addressing this question, one must consider the importance of
force as a factor in conflict resolution. The ability to exert force may
tyranny. Professor Brown responds that it is arcane to believe, in this age of weapons of
mass destruction, that individual arms in the hands of citizens can play any useful role in
thwarting threats. She adds that the vision of an armed community, collectively resisting
the excesses of state power, is dangerously naive and even sexist.
38. See, e.g., Russell Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69
VA. L. REv. 223, 230 (1983) ("The colonists premised their fight for independence, when
the time came, on the natural law-social contract theory expounded by numerous writers,
foremost among them John Locke."); Randy E. Barnett, Are Enumerated Constitutional
Rights the Only Rights We Have? A Case of Associational Freedom, 10 HARV. J.L. PUB.
POL'Y 101, 102-04 (1987)
[A]ccording to a Lockean political and moral analysis: "Individuals have rights,
and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their
rights)" . ... Fascinating though such intellectual history might be, what could it
possibly have to do with contemporary constitutional jurisprudence.... The
connection lies in the fact that the authors of our Constitution were very much
influenced, by the Lockean philosophy of "rights first-government second." The
Founders saw that the creation of government requires constitutional limits on the
power of government.
Id.
39. Professor Barnett, addressing the difficulty of deriving individual rights from the
Ninth Amendment, argues that derivation of unenumerated individual rights is in harmony
with the Declaration of Independence: that [all men] are endowed . . . with certain
inalienable rights, [including] Life [and] Liberty." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Barnett argues further that "[s]uch a declaration of rights need not be
religiously based. Instead it may rest in part on a view that the respect for certain
individual rights is a prerequisite for achieving the common good; that no matter how
desirable its appearance, a measure that violated a proper conception of these rights would
invariably detract from the common good .... " Barnett, supra note 9, at 54.
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impact the degree to which individual liberty succumbs to the collective
will. 40 Assuming the goal of a balance between individual liberty and
collective interests, there is something unattractive about placing all of
where they are likely only to be used
the most effective tools of violence
41
interests.
collective
further
to
If we reject this conclusion, then we should examine the degree to
which our doing so is a result of making one of three assumptions: 1)
the constitutional importance of the Lockean vision of individual rights
must yield to the Classical Republican vision; 2) the concept of Lockean
individualism must depend on the benevolence and goodwill of the
collective in its exercise of a monopoly on the tools of violence; or 3)
there is something inherent in our constitutional structure that will
restrain the collective's monopoly on force and prevent it from bending
individual interests utterly in the direction of the collective will. To the
degree we rely particularly on the last two of these assumptions we may
have cause for concern.
The problem is illustrated by turning the issue on its head. The
question then would be whether the Classical Republican vision of
liberty through a strong state could survive if government were
prevented from possessing and using arms. Could government
successfully rely on the goodwill of armed citizens? Would unilaterally
armed citizens conform both to the decisions reached in the democratic
process and to the authority exercised by their representatives? Given
such an imbalance in the ability to use force, we might expect that
collective interests would readily succumb to individual interests in
instances of serious conflict. An imbalance in the opposite direction,
then, could have an equivalent impact. In instances of significant
conflict, the unrestrained government power resulting from a disarmed
citizenry could permit collective interests to utterly dominate individual
interests. Under such circumstances, the Lockean vision of
government's role seems to evaporate. 42

40. See infra text accompanying notes 189-97.
41. This argument is similar to the Second Amendment concept of an armed militia
resisting internal despotism. Here, the focus is on the cumulative impact of actual or
potential individual acts of resistance to collective power.
42. Arguably, given the extraordinary scope of collective efforts in numerous areas
and the corresponding infringements on individual liberty, this imbalance already has
occurred, and the elimination of one more barrier against collective intrusion into the core
of individual interests will make no difference.
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There is an unacknowledged kinship between Second and Ninth
Amendment scholars. Each has produced Lockean support for armed
self defense. 4 3 Professor Barnett uses Locke to advocate a Ninth
Amendment right to associational freedom. 44 Particularly pertinent for
these purposes, Professor Barnett notes:
A Lockean approach proceeds to identify more fundamental background
rights that do not evaporate upon the creation of a government or the
expression of a majority will. Locke called these rights "property rights;"
that is, rights to acquire, use and transfer ownership of resources in the
world. Such rights are the principal means by which life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness are facilitated in the social context. Such rights
include not only the right to external resources but also the right to one's
45
person.

Taking a natural rights view of the Ninth Amendment, Professor
Moore draws substantially on Locke, citing many passages, which
simultaneously support an invigorated Ninth Amendment and, though it
was not Moore's intent, lay a foundation for or directly support an
individual right to arms. Notably he quotes Locke's observation that:
[G]overnment is the product of free contract, that the governors of a
people hold their authority only in trust, that when such trust is violated,
a people can rightly exercise their strength-though only under the
46
greatest provocation-to undo tyranny.

His selection from Locke's chapter entitled "Of Slavery" in the Second
Treatise on Civil Government is also noteworthy:
This freedom from absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to, and
closely joined with, a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it but
by what forfeits his preservation and life together. For a man not having
43. See, e.g., Rapaczynski, supra note 12, at 184 n.17. (citing Locke to illustrate
that under one view of the Ninth Amendment it is quite plausible to derive a right to rebel
against an unjust government even though such a right might not be judicially
enforceable).
44. Barnett, supra note 38, at 109-10.
45. Id. at 109.
46. Moore, supra note 36, at 228. Several of Moore's other selections are similarly
supportive. Quoting from the Second Treatise on Civil Government, Moore cites Locke's
admonition that "every one as he is bound to preserve himself.., by like reason ... is
not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to
the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another." Id. at 231.
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the power of his own life cannot be compact, for his own consent
arbitrary
enslaves himself to anyone, nor put himself under the 4absolute
7
power of another to take away his life when he pleases.

Lockean support has figured prominently in Second Amendment
commentators' work. Stephen Halbrook, for example, cites Locke's
Second Treatise on Civil Government as direct support for a right to
individual self-defense: "[iut being reasonable and just that I should
48
have the right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction.
Halbrook argues that Locke strongly opposed a disarmed populace:
It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do,
to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons
and estates, and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his
unlimited will arbitrarily upon them. This were [sic] to put themselves
into a worse condition than in the state of nature, wherein they had a
liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others and were upon
equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man or
many in combination. Whereas, by supposing they have given up
themselves to the absolute power and will of a legislator, they have
disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make prey of them when he
pleases. 49

The Lockean view that core individual rights exist without being created
by the state offers a comfortable pathway to a meaningful Ninth
Amendment. It is not surprising that Locke endorsed an individual
right to security against physical threats. Any effort to invigorate the
Ninth Amendment through John Locke's political philosophy must
either acknowledge that an individual right to arms stands high among
protected rights or find efforts to exclude it troublesome.

47. Id. at 231.
48. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,

THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 28 (citing LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE ON CivIL GOVERNMENT 14 (Chicago 1955)).
49. Id. at 29 (citing LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 14 (Chicago

1955)).
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT: DO THEY SQUARE
WITH DISARMAMENT?

A. Fearof Government.
The idea that the framers feared and distrusted the power sited in the
federal government specifically, and perhaps collective power generally,
is vital to giving meaning to the Ninth Amendment. 50 Acknowledging
this should engender difficulty with disarmament, for disarming means
entrusting exclusively to government some of the most important tools
for maintaining individual security. It means trusting government to use
its exclusive power to benevolently and competently protect its
citizenry. 5 1 Our political history shows that placing blind trust in
government may be dangerous. 52 Another choice, wholly abandoning
50. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1980).
[T]here was widespread distrust of the remote newcomer, a federal government
removed by vast distances from the governed, wherein large states might outvote
the small, and in which there could be clashing sectional interests ....
As
Jefferson said, "[ilt is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited
constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power."
Id. at 3-4.
See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Randy E. Barnett, Two
Conceptions of the Ninth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL'Y 29; Levinson, supra
note 2, at 648 ("surely one of the foundations of American political thought of the period
was the well-justified concern about political corruption and consequential governmental
tyranny").
Describing this fear while explaining the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, the
Duncan Court notes:
Providing the accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against
the compliant, biased or eccentric judge ... Fear of unchecked power, so typical
of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the
criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the
determination of guilt or innocence.
Id. at 156.
51. Such trust is problematic, because there is no reciprocal duty to guarantee
adequate distribution of collective security resources. See, e.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686
F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that "there is no constitutional right to be
protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen.").
52. In his autobiography, Claude Pepper reveals a darker side to the political world.
CLAUDE D. PEPPER, PEPPER: EYEWTrNss TO A CENTURY (1987).
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[E]very Senator was aware that the colleague whose elbow he brushed against, or
the one sitting across the aisle with the 'opposition party, could well be the next
president of the United States. When my eyes fell on certain senators, this was an
unsettling thought, for the Senate is peopled by charlatans and mediocrities as
well as by men (and too rarely women) of unquestioned integrity and uncommon
intelligence.
Id. at 127
As another example, Pepper recalls the following: "In a talk with an ignorant, albeit
typical Southern sheriff named Bill Towles, I was appalled to hear him say that he had
promised to resign his office if a single Negro voted during his term. He even asked me if I
had ever shaken hands with a Negro." Id. at 227-28.
In conversations with Bill Moyers, captured in his reflective book, several notable
contemporary figures fuel the perception that blind trust in government is not only
repugnant to the ideas embraced by the framers, but also, on a practical level, risky. BILL
MOYERS, A WORLD OF IDEAS, CONVERSATIONS WITH THOUGHTFUL MEN AND WOMEN ABOUT
AMERICAN LIFE TODAY AND THE IDEAS SHAPING OUR FUTuRE (Doubleday 1989).

Norm Chomsky suggests:
We've been extremely lucky in the United States that we've never really had a
charismatic leader who was capable of organizing people around power and its use.
There were people who came close, but most of them didn't make it. Joe McCarthy
was too much of a thug, and Richard Nixon nobody could trust, and Ronald Reagan
people regard as basically a clown. There has not been a figure who could do that.
But it could happen. In a depoliticized society with few mechanisms for people to
express their fears and needs and to participate constructively in managing the
affairs of life, someone could come along who was interested not in personal gain,
but in power. That could be very dangerous.
Id. at 55.
Political Philosopher Sheldon Wolin argues:
I think we don't [have a democracy now]. The idea of democracy and the idea of a
strong centralized state, inherently bureaucratic and administrative in its structure
and orientation, are not compatible notions. Democracy implies involvement,
shared power, and, above all, a significant equality. State power means the
opposite of those things.
Id. at 99.
Historian Forrest McDonald expresses an idea that harkens back directly to the
framers' expressed fears. The founding fathers designed the government to be
incompetent, because they did not trust power. Id. at 117.
The way they rigged the institutions to express this distrust of power is based
upon the assumption that men in public life are ruled by their passions, their love
of power and money. So what you do, in the words of James Madison, is to make
ambition check ambition and interest check interest. You rig the government in
such a way that all parts of it are working at cross-purposes. Hopefully, on the
average, it won't be able to do very much, and therefore, it won't cause much
mischief.
Id.
McDonald further stated:
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the idea that distrust of government is necessary and proper, seems
equally ill-advised. This distrust is, after all, independently important to
53
invigorating the Ninth Amendment.
B. ForcedReliance on Government
Disarmament may push us to the unprecedented step of forcing
individuals to rely solely on government to protect a fundamental
human concern. Traditionally, we have believed that the Constitution
gives government certain options to exert power and restricts the ways
that power can be exercised. It is highly controversial to say that
anything in the Constitution guarantees citizens benefits from
government, including individual protection. Disarmament would have
us take the more troublesome leap past guaranteed benefits directly to
forced dependency. While we may be at a point where such dependency
is encouraged by many and would be forced by some, we should
acknowledge that such dependency is a major departure from the
framers' design.
When we consider the imposition of the same limitations on other
basic human concerns or currently perceived constitutional rights, the
problem is exposed. Would it satisfy us to be forced to rely on
government for our economic security in the form of a dole check, a
system where the accumulation of private wealth was prohibited in
favor of collective measures? Should the government directly control
the engines of commerce, forcing us to trust our representatives to
administer those engines effectively and benevolently? Would it satisfy
The continental Congress had no executive arm, and they went along for a dozen
years or so, convinced that executive power is the root of all evil ....[T]hey were
scared of it .... The only reason they were willing to have a one-man executive
was because George Washington was there ....[They would be] horrified [at what
has happened to the office]. They wouldn't be surprised though. They would say,
"Yep."
Id.
53. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 9, at 37.
The only question that remains is whether the enumerated rights standing alone are
adequate to either of these power constraining tasks. The answer is as obvious today as it
was to the Framers. There is no telling in advance exactly how extensively the powers
authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause may be used or abused, and once the scheme
of delegated powers is eroded, there is no telling what rights the national government may
violate. Trying to preserve limited government without recourse to unenumerated rights
retained by the people is a project doomed to failure.
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us to have only government outlets as the forums for exercise of our
First Amendment rights? Would we be satisfied if government owned
the media, but was firmly committed, through the best rhetorical
guarantees we could imagine, to administering it in our best interests?
Would we consider forced exclusive reliance on public education, public
housing, or public food distribution acceptable?
Given the less than perfect track record of collective attempts to
solve individual problems, and the viable arguments that government
involvement has exacerbated those problems, it may be a severe
mistake for individuals to rely completely on collective measures to
satisfy their basic needs and repugnant that they be forced to do so. 54
We may find it difficult to explain how forced reliance on government
for individual security is constitutionally more palatable than forced
reliance for less substantial human concerns. The difficulty is magnified
when we consider that the collective commitment to protecting
55
individuals from physical threats is only discretionary.
Several writers have taken a natural rights view of the Ninth
Amendment, arguing that the founders conceived of a host of
indefeasible natural rights that could not be taken away even by an
exercise of majority will "without violating [them]. ' ' 56 From at least
one notable perspective, forcing individuals to rely on government to
preserve their lives violates one of the fundamental natural rights of
man. 57 Proceeding from a natural rights view, the Ninth Amendment
54. The plight of unpensioned retirees reliant on social security and medicare,
families reliant on food stamps and AFDC payments, and families without healthcare or
life insurance all illustrate the subpar consequences of centralized administration of
generic services aimed at fulfilling individual human needs. This is not to disparage the
collective efforts in these areas; rather, the examples are meant to acknowledge the likely
impossibility of providing totally satisfactory individual services through a collectively
administered vehicle. In a free society, individuals need to supplement collective efforts
that attempt to provide for human needs and desires. It is curious that we would depart from
this position when evaluating the preeminent human concern of self-preservation.
55. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); Warren v. District of
Colombia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981); Joseph T. Bockrath, Annotation, Liability of
Municipality or Other Governmental Unit for Failure to Provide Police Protection, 46
A.L.R.3d 1084 (1972).
56. Barnett, supra note 50, at 103. See discussion of the natural rights perspective,
infra notes 199-213 and accompanying text.
57. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 116 (E.P. Dutton ed., 1950) (cited in Hardy,
Historiography,supra note 26, at 130).
The second, the sum of the right of nature [is] by all means we can to defend
ourselves . . .A Covenant not to defend my self from force, by force is always
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supports not only an individual right to arms, but also the argument that
the right cannot be restricted by collective action even in the form of a
58
prohibitive constitutional amendment.
Alternatively, Dr. Lund contends that "the basic postulate of liberal
theory [is] that citizens only surrender their natural rights to the extent
that they are recompensed with more effective political rights."'59 If this
sentiment influences our view of when individual options can be
restricted, then disarmament may be inappropriate so long as there is no
constitutional right to protection by the state from violent threats. 6°
Even if a constitutional right to protection by the state were
established as a counterweight to an individual right to arms, we would
have to consider the effectiveness of such a guarantee. Experience
shows that in virtually any large-scale, collective effort, there are jagged
edges around the mold causing many people, often the unpopular or
powerless, to fall away as dross. Certainly, particular individuals and
communities have experienced an allocation of collective resources that
disfavors them. In many instances, the tacit response might be that they
already take more than they put into the collective pot and they ought to
do more for themselves.
In this analysis, that response changes and raises with it the problem
of inevitably limited public resources. We should expect those
individuals at the end of the line for allocation of other government
resources also to be the last in line for security services. 61 Moreover, in
vod. For (as if have shewd before) no man can transfer, or lay down his Right to
save himselfe from Death.
Id.
58. There may be a common theme connecting Hobbes's position and that of
contemporary American gun owners. One doubts that the majority of them have read
Hobbes, but Hobbes's perception that the right to defend against violence with violence
is indefeasible is plainly reflected in the views of some gun owners. One of the better
bumper sticker slogans is "Make all the laws you want. You ain't gettin mine." See also
infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
59. Lund, supra note 28, at 123.
60. For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see infra notes 237-47 and
accompanying text.
61. One historic example of this phenomenon that may have modem parallels is the
experience of black freemen during and after reconstruction. One scholar has documented
in sometimes gruesome detail the circumstances of unarmed freemen, reliant on collective
security mechanisms during that period. Barry Crouch, A Spirit of Lawlessness: White
Violence, Texas Blacks 1865-1868, 18 J. Soc. HIST. 217 (1984). According to Crouch:
The question of protecting blacks from white violence did arise in the state
legislature. According to both Generals Sheridan and Reynolds, white Texans were
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any grand design to protect a disarmed citizenry, the system simply will
breakdown. When that occurs, even a constitutional guarantee of
protection by the state will be meaningless. 62

more concerned about Indians killing whites on the frontier than whites murdering
blacks in the interior. The movement of troops from the frontier to the interior,
Reynolds reported, would weaken the former posts "but the bold, wholesale
murdering in the interior of the State seems at present a more urgent demand for
the troops than Indian depredations." Sheridan wrote: It is strange that over a
white man killed by Indians on an extensive frontier, the greatest excitement will
take place; but over the killing of many freedmen in the settlements, nothing is
done.
Id. at 230 n.17 (citations omitted).
One can argue that more recently during the turmoil of the civil rights movement
something similar occurred. See, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER
KiNG JR. (1981). In a telegram to J. Edgar Hoover, King wrote:
I have sincerely questioned the effectiveness of the FBI in racial incidents,
particularly where bombings and brutalities against Negroes are at issue .... This
is part of the broader question of federal involvement in the protection of Negroes
in the South and the seeming inability to gain convictions in even the most
heinous crimes perpetrated against civil rights workers . . . . FBI agents
inevitably work with local law enforcement officers in car thefts, bank robberies
and other interstate violations. This makes it difficult for them to function
effectively in cases where the rights and safety of Negro citizens are being
threatened by these same law enforcement officers .... I have always made myself
available to all FBI agents of the Atlanta office and encouraged our staff and
affiliates to cooperate with them in spite of the fact that many of our people have
suspicions and distrust of the FBI as a result of the slow pace of justice in the
South.
Id. at 122-23.
Even if we dismiss these concerns to history, they illustrate that there is nothing
inherent in our national character or the structure of our government that eliminates the
dangers of biased allocation of collective security resources. The prerequisites to a
recurrence of this type of situation seem to be only a shift in national mood. See also infra
text accompanying notes 163-88.
62. Consider the consequences of Hurricane Hugo, the San Francisco earthquake, and
a war in the Persian Gulf that generate acts of war on American soil occurring
simultaneously. This might easily overtax our collective security and emergency
response mechanisms. A disarmed citizenry would be helpless against the threats that
could arise. One scenario illustrates the point.
Given the Iraqis' discemable aim to whittle away the popular support for the Gulf War
by making the suffering real to Americans, attacks on undefended neighborhoods or
remote towns might have been effective. Against terrorists using small arms, armed
individuals could be expected to fare better than their unarmed neighbors. The option to
resist such a threat would be valued by all but the most committed pacifists.
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Some of us are comfortable with forcing individuals to cede
firearms exclusively to collective control. This stance forces an array of
uncomfortable assumptions. It implies that an individual's interest in
self-preservation is not so important that it cannot be ignored in the
interest of order or making governing easier. It assumes that unarmed
individuals are at no disadvantage against armed aggressors. It demands
that agents of government can and will be summoned and arrive the
instant a violent threat arises. It presumes that only agents of
government can be qualified to resist violent aggression in kind and
must do so on behalf of citizens who cannot defend themselves. It relies
on government's competence and benevolence, and on the future's
predictability, ensuring that collective measures will be sufficient to
resist the threats that arise. Perhaps more troubling than all of these is
the assumption that the most effective mode of self defense permitted
under a constitution written by revolutionaries, who distrusted
government and believed in innumerable individual rights, is the First
Amendment right to scream 911.
C. The Impossibility of Trusting Collective Security Mechanisms
Simply as a matter of logistics, it may be impossible for citizens
confidently to put their trust in collective security resources. Exclusive
reliance on collective security mechanisms exacerbates an inherent
problem: violent threats to individuals do not come pre-announced.
Consequently, collective security resources cannot be present at the
instant needed. 63 The situation would be much like telling a climber that
all ropes will be collectively controlled. If he begins to fall, then he need
only call, and an agent of government will be dispatched to bring the
rope that will prevent his injury or death. Unfortunately, once the need
for the resource arises, assistance will in many instances be too late.
63. Attitudes about the wisdom of relying on collective security resources to arrive
in time may be impacted by whether one's perspective is urban or rural. For those who live
in rural areas with small police forces and distant neighbors, a collectively administered
security force only a phone call away is a fantasy. This fiction might be easier to accept if
one lives in an urban area.
Studies in the social sciences show "an inverse relationship between gun ownership
and confidence in the ability of police to provide adequate protection." See Robert L.
Young, Perceptionsof Crime, Racial Attitudes, and Firearms Ownership, 64 Soc. FORCES
473, 476 (1985). This might explain a trend in the views of rural inhabitants on gun
issues.
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Taking the analogy further to incorporate the additional problem of
limited resources by assuming that there are at any one time one
hundred actual climbers, thousands of potential climbers and only five
rope administrators, together with the acute nature of the need, we
should question the wisdom of the decision which prohibited self-help
and individual ownership of ropes.
D. A Core Vision of America
We might also consider whether the type of society that would
justify and benefit from disarmament was the type anticipated by the
founders. The question does not suggest that we should develop
precisely in accordance with the framers' vision or that the Constitution
is inflexible, but, to the degree that changes in our society precipitate a
movement toward greater reliance on government, we may begin to
break away qualitatively from sentiments that are at the core of our
constitutional design. Against this backdrop we can evaluate whether the
vision of America that drives disarmament advocacy conflicts with vital
constitutional principles.
By many accounts the framers envisioned a rural agrarian based
America. Central to their vision was the conviction that one significant
threat to liberty was the decay and decadence brought on by the urban
centers' focus on luxury and commerce. Indeed, one rationalization for
westward expansion was to satiate the growing need for land to support
this vision. 64 Adopting Jefferson's view that urbanization would lead
inexorably to the diminution of liberty and a decay of the core values
that the Constitution preserves, 65 we can usefully ask whether
disarmament advocacy is driven by an urban vision that exalts luxury at
the expense of individual liberty. To the degree it is, it may be in conflict
with our core constitutional values. 66

64. "Jefferson, in his jubilation, declared that the [Louisiana] purchase would enable
the United States to remain a nation of farmers and land developers-and thus to avoid the
evil of urbanization that had corrupted Europe-'for a thousand years."' FORREST
MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 69 (1987).
65. Id.
66. This structure of analysis is appropriate not only for examining an individual
right to arms, but also for informing our debates about the desirable level of dependence
on government, its size and proper functions, and the degree to which collective power
ought to impact individuals.
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More than one commentator has observed that the conflicting
positions on the gun issue are a consequence of two conflicting views of
the ideal American society:
The first is probably predominantly urban. Their view takes bourgeois
Europe as a model of civilized society[,] a just, equitable and democratic
[society]. . . . [They view] personal violence [as] shameful . . . and
uncontrolled gun ownership as a blot upon civilization. [The alternative
vision is held by a group that is predominantly rural. They] do not tend to
be especially articulate or literate, and [their] world view is rarely
expressed in print. Their model is that of the independent frontiersman
who takes care of himself and his family with no interference from the
state. They are "conservative" in the sense that they cling to America's
unique pre-modern tradition-a non-feudal society with a sort of medieval
liberty at large for every man. To these people . . . [L]ife is tough and
67
competitive. Manhood means responsibility and caring for your own.

An individual right to arms fits very comfortably within the vision
of rural Americans. Because rural life is not glorified in our society, the
rural vision may not be popular. 68 Nonetheless, it remains reasonable to
believe that vision of America is more in accordance with that of the

67. Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 2, at 227 (citing Bruce Briggs, The Great
American Gun War, PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 61 (1976)).

Conflicting world views emphasizing self-sufficiency and independence on one hand
and interdependence and community cooperation on the other fuel the gun debate. The way
we strike the balance is influenced by where we are. We err in favor of order if our
immediate circumstances would suffer substantially from diminution of order. On the other
hand, where individual liberty can be exercised without much damage, we are prone to
choose a greater measure of individual liberty.
In rural America, people have space to be more self-sufficient. We can thrive longer
without being affected by another human or spending a dime for the services of another
person. We may be more prone to seek individual solutions to everyday problems.

Probably less of what we do, what we need, and what we want is affected by community
decisions.

Disarmament advocacy implicitly centers on urban society, where any significant
exercise of individual autonomy can significantly impact the community. Urban citizens

have become dependent, embracing the expectation that many things will and should be
taken care of without individual effort or individual thought. Cooperation and order may be
more important than liberty.
68. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 637. Professor Levinson touches on this
phenomenon while describing how the political views of different groups are informed by
their immediate surroundings. He suggests that Second Amendment debate is .affected
substantially by the political ideology of the viewer. Id. at 639.
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framers than is the urban based view that may be the predominant
influence on our popular culture. 69
Historian Robert Shalhope argues that James Harrington's work
was of preeminent importance in developing the libertarian idea that the
popular possession of arms was indispensable to democratic
government. Harrington argued that democratic institutions depended
on a "'virtuous' citizenry," 70 requiring the dual attributes of land
ownership and possession of arms. "From Harrington, libertarians
came to conceptualize civic virtue in terms of the armed freeholder:
upstanding, courageous, self-reliant, individually able to repulse outlaws
and oppressive officials .... ',71 Shalhope draws additional support
72
from eighteenth century libertarians James Burgh and Richard Price.
He enlists Burgh to emphasize that:
[t]he very character of the people-the cornerstone and strength of a
republican society-was related to the individual's ability and desire to
arm and defend himself against threats to his person . . . . An integral
relationship existed between the possession of arms and the spirit and
character of the people. For this reason Burgh lamented the state to
which English society had fallen. Having become a people interested
only in luxury and commerce, Englishmen had surrendered their
arms ....
Burgh's distress over the loss of virility and virtue in English
society echoed that of his fellow libertarians ....
These men related the
down-fall of English society to an increasingly luxury-loving people ....
True virtue sprang from the agrarian world of self sufficient warriors ....

69. Kates, OriginalMeaning, supra note 2, at 227.
7 0.

JAMES HARRINGTON, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON (J. Pocock ed.,
1977); Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 125, 128 (1986) (citing J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975)).
71. Id.
72. Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J.
AM. HiST. 599 (1982).
Price drew the clearest contrast between the perceived decadence of England and the
virtuous strength of America, arguing that
[t]he happiest state of man is the middle state between the savage and the
[..
refined or between the wild and the luxurious state. Such is the state of society in
. . . the American provinces; where the inhabitants consist, if I am rightly
informed, of an independent and hardy yeomanry, all nearly on a level -trained to
arms-instructed in their rights-cloaked in homespun-of simple mannersstrangers to luxury -drawing plenty from the ground-and plenty gathered easily
by the hand of industry.
Id. at 605.
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There was, however, still some hope in the libertarians' minds: America
was an agrarian society of self-sufficient husbandmen trained in arms.
73
There the lamp of liberty might still burn brightly.

This conception of the American citizenry "became common in
pamphlet literature on both sides of the Atlantic... [and] permeated the
writings of Americans during and after the Revolution. '74 The vision of
an America in which individual arms are an integral part seems more
consistent with the framers' conception of the democratic society than is
75
the amalgam of concerns that makes up our popular culture.
We can reasonably believe that an appropriate conception of the
unenumerated rights protected by the Ninth Amendment are those
rights deemed to be fundamental by the framers. 76 Embracing a vision
of America which is fundamentally at odds with that held by the
framers-one which implicitly rejects guarantees vital to individuals
functioning within that original vision-might require something more
explicit and formal than a slow evolution of constitutional doctrine and
legislation implementing the modern vision. The only appropriate
77
course may be the protracted battle of constitutional amendment.

73. Id. at 604-05.
74. Id.

75. It is not difficult to appreciate the conclusion that weapons ownership and
shooting build responsibility or character of a type considered indispensable by the
framers. Armed individuals must face the knowledge that abuse means disaster. It is not
government or societal rules that avert such disaster but individual self control, discipline,
and attention to safety. Arms are power in the hand, and their use offers an opportunity to
know what it is to exercise power responsibly.
76. Barnett, supra note 38, at 104.
77. The similarities between the debate over extending constitutional rights to black
people through the Fourteenth Amendment and the likely components of a national debate
over individual disarmament are substantial. In both instances, the question of the natural
or fundamental principles arises. In both cases constitutional adjustment substantially
impacts conflicting interests. Both episodes generate a deep split in fundamental
assumptions and beliefs about individuals and society. In both instances the national
catharsis of proposed constitutional amendment may be the most appropriate treatment.
Even in the face of a confiscatory amendment, some would argue the right to arms
still exists. For those who adopt a natural rights view, even a constitutional amendment
might not compel individual disarmament. See infra notes 199-213 and accompanying
text.
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E. The Dangerof PurelyAbstract Controls on Collective Power
A commitment to disarmament may require an unsustainable
conviction that there are sufficient systemic controls on collective
instruments of violence. We fear guns in the hands of individuals
because we perceive an inadequacy in the restraints to prevent their
abuse. The same fear should exist with guns exclusively in the hands of
government. 78 In both cases, the predominant deterrent to abuse is
conceptual.
The restraint on individuals arises from the possibility that some
actual physical sanction will follow episodes of abuse. In comparison,
assuming successful citizen disarmament, there would be no capacity
for resistance to collective abuse of force. The only protections against
that abuse would be systemic internal checks and the rhetoric that
accompanies them. Before we reject an individual right to arms, we
should scrutinize the notion that the rhetoric which ostensibly controls
collective power is effective enough to justify ceding all of our
79
significant instruments of violence to government.
Apprehension about the effectiveness of rhetoric to restrain the
collective power is not new. James Madison, the "chief sponsor and
drafter of the Bill of Rights,"' 80 referred to state bills of rights as
"parchment barriers [that had been violated] by overbearing majorities
in every state."' 8 1 Blackstone's commentaries reflect the same
apprehension that arms in the hands of individuals are essential to the
protection of individual rights. 82 The same apprehension, although not
78. One difficulty with the idea of armed conflict between citizens and government is
that it seems grounded on the antiquated concept of trial by fire, the conviction that right
ultimately will prevail. It hinges on the faith that the outcome of a citizen's confrontation
with government will be just, but the willingness to disarm the population similarly
hinges on the faith that democracy will withstand all manner of pressures on its own as if
divinely protected, and it never will require solid physical intervention to protect it
against despotism or other systemic threats.
79. See discussion infra notes 237-47 and accompanying text.
80. Hardy, Armed Citizens, supra note 26, at 605.
81. Id. (citing 11 JAMES MADISON, PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 297 (R. Ruthland & C.

Hobson eds., 1977)).
82. Describing the primary rights of Englishmen as personal security, personal
liberty, and private property, Blackstone declared that "in vain would these rights be
declared, ascertained and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if the Constitution had
provided no other method to secure their actual enjoyment." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND * 140 quoted in John Levin, The Right to Bear
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always connected to individual arms ownership,
is reflected in the work
83
of modem commentators from various fields.
Collective power restrained by rhetoric alone was one of the
concerns of the antifederalists. A particular concern was that the federal
government would use a monopoly on arms to "extort the enormous
sums that will be necessary to support the civil list-to maintain the
Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 148, 153
(1971). In addition to these primary rights, Blackstone described a group of auxiliary
rights that allowed for protection of the primary rights beyond the dead letter of the law.
He included among these the right of "having arms for their defense .... [w]hich ... is
indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and selfpreservation when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the
violence of oppression." Id. at 153-54 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra, at *143-44).
A similar sentiment is reflected in the reaction to efforts by Charles I to confiscate
citizens' arms:
Wails of dispair were heard from city after city as the royal Army confiscated
public magazines and disarmed local residents. "The best of it is" a distraught and
disarmed townsman of Nantwich wrote, "if we stay at home, we are now their
slaves. Being naked, they will have of us what they list, and do with us what they
list." Forewarned was forearmed, and from 1642 Englishmen learned to hide their
firearms and stockpile weapons.
Joyce Lee Malcom, Disarmed: The Loss of the Right to Bear Arms in Restoration England
8 (Bunting Institute of Radcliffe College 1980).
83. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 2, at 656. Levinson stated:
I do not want to argue that the state is necessarily tyrannical; I am not an
anarchist. But it seems foolhardy to assume that the armed state will necessarily
be benevolent. The American political tradition is for good or ill based in large
measure on a healthy mistrust of the state. The development of widespread suffrage
and greater majoritarianism in our polity is itself no sure protection, at least
within republican theory .... In any event, it is hard for me to see how one can

argue that circumstances have so changed as to make mass disarmament
constitutionally unproblematic.
Id.
See also Commentary, From the Bastille to Tienanmen Square, 60 POL. Q. 259, 261
(1989) (1[I1f the chips were down and a future western government really determined to
smash an inconvenient mass movement, what use are all the charters, laws, customs when
the troops march in?"); PRESTON KING, FEAR OF POWER 2 (1967).

Tocqueville's virtue was to understand, and for the first time really effectively to
argue, that the designation of a ruler or a body of rulers could not, either in theory
or practice, defend against unjust rule. For kings, aristocrats and democrats may
rule wisely or foolishly, fairly or tyrannically, while all power is subject to abuse.
Tocqueville affirmed that no government, simply because it established a
particular type of sovereign, could be assumed, through this, to afford a cast-iron
guarantee against injustice and intolerance.
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regalia of power-and the splendor of the most useless part of the
community, or they may be sent into foreign countries for the
fulfillment of treaties."' 84 We may have reached a level of collective
fund raising 85 where it is possible to conclude that something like this
type of coercion actually has occurred. Judge Arnold begins his analysis
of the utility and necessity of an enlivened Ninth Amendment by stating
that we currently face massive coercion, which supports a liberal social
vision based on income redistribution and collective interference with
private contracts. 86 However, with revenue collection having progressed
to this stage with at least an ostensibly armed citizenry, we should
consider what further reaches could occur were there not some minor

84. ELBRIDGE GERRY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND ON THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONVENTIONS, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 56

(Paul L. Ford ed., 1888). See also ANDREW FLETCHER, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF ANDREW

FLETCHER 9 (London 1737) ("[H]e that is armed, is always master of the purse of him that
is unarmed"), cited in Shalhope, supra note 72, at 603.
85. If one totals the federal, state and local income taxes, sales taxes, real estate
taxes, ad valorem taxes, and social security taxes, together with the powerful enforcement
mechanisms developed to police payment of them, it becomes rather easy to be
sympathetic to the argument that payment of these demands is not consensual.
86. Morris S. Arnold, Doing More than Remembering the Ninth Amendment, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 (1988). In his opening paragraph, Judge Arnold argues that:
[t]he recent revival of interest in the Ninth Amendment is partly due to
dissatisfaction with the intrusive bureaucratic state created in this country over the
last fifty years. The Ninth Amendment is, of course, a fairly obvious place to look
for protection from the ravages of positivism, for it holds out at least a modicum
of hope to those who value liberty and autonomy-those, that is, who would like
to locate in the Constitution something like a general right to be left alone. Such
people used to be called liberals, but that label has ironically been appropriated
by persons with a social vision which requires massive coercion to effect and
maintain it. This coercion appears in a large number of forms, but most frequently

it manifests itself in two ways: first, in interventionist statutes that prohibit the
enforcement of some contracts or compel the creation of others; and second, in
takings and redistributions of wealth that have rendered the promise of just
compensation held out in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments a virtual dead
letter. Since the possibility of enforcement is what often, though by no means
always, induces obedience to law, guns and jails lurk behind these laws, however
subtle may be the camouflage, and however worthy their progenitors think them
to be. Much recent Ninth Amendment scholarship is generated by a desire to find
some sanctuary from what is perceived as majoritarian tyranny.

Id. at 265.
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fear of a serious and meaningful tax revolt or the cumulative effect of
numerous individual acts of resistance. 87
Abstract rhetorical limitations on collective power seem to be weak
barriers to abuse. Abstract codes cannot deter individuals intent on
breaching them or those who have rationalized their breach. It is difficult
to conclude, once even the nominal capability 88 to resist collective
violence is surrendered, that we may rest easy in the belief that collective
power is effectively restrained.8 9
F.

Consent of the Governed

Constitutionally valid disarmament is difficult to square with the
idea that government exists subject to the consent of the governed. That
our representatives serve rather than rule is one of the fundamental
structural supports of our constitutional system. It usefully informs our
views of the substantive rights that may be derived from the Ninth
Amendment, 90 and it generates direct support for an individual right to
arms.

87. Given that we may now face the type of overreaching exertion of power that was
feared by the antifederalists we might conclude one of two things. We might say that
disarmament now is a non-issue because the gap between the abilities of individuals and
government to use force is so wide that arms in the hands of individual citizens are
virtually meaningless. Alternatively, we might conclude that the current balance compels
preservation of existing levels of individual access to arms; so long as this level is
maintained, the imbalance might be adjusted to a point where resistance to coercion
becomes real enough to act as a counterweight against government action.
88. See also infra notes 118-88 and accompanying text.
89. One can conjure up images of massive passive resistance and noble sacrifices in
the vein of Tiananmen Square; however, these images ignore the power of bluff. The threat
of force and its moderate implementation against unarmed groups is a highly effective and
relatively low-cost tactic. Contrast this with the type of government violence against
citizens that would be necessary to truly overwhelm an armed populace. True, government
will have a monopoly on weapons of mass destruction, but the decision to use those on a
domestic civilian population is much less likely than the decision simply to show and
threaten force.
90. Our system of government may have become something less than democratic and
consensual. Political philosopher Sheldon Wolin argues that contemporary American
society is not a democracy. "The idea of democracy and the idea of a strong centralized
state, inherently bureaucratic and administrative in its structure and orientation, are not
compatible notions. Democracy implies involvement, shared power .
MOYERS, supra
note 52, at 99.
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In Federalist 28, Hamilton tied the right to arms to the idea that
government exists through the consent of the governed. "If the
representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no
recourse left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense,
which is paramount to all positive forms of government ... ."91 Here at
once is a right to arms, tied directly to the belief that government must
be consensual, and the conviction that armed self-defense is a freedom
which citizens cannot properly cede and government cannot validly
impair.
Federalist 28 is merely one indication that the framers considered an
individual right to arms to be an essential element of consensual
government. Aristotle wrote that where "the farmers have no arms, the
workers have neither land nor arms; this makes them virtually the
servants of those who do possess arms." 92 This classical source is
particularly relevant because it is invoked directly by thinkers and
writers of the revolutionary period. John Adams, for example, in A
Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America,93 enlists similar writings by Aristotle through quotations from
94
Marchamont Nedham's The Right Constitution of a Commonwealth:
One consequence of [armed citizens] was "that nothing could at any time
be imposed upon the people but by their consent ...As Aristotle tells us,
in his fourth book on Politics, the Grecian states ever had special care to
place the use and exercise of arms in the people, because the

91. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 227 (James Madison) (Random House, Inc. 1964).
92. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 71 (Sinclair trans., 1962), cited in Richard Gardiner, To
Preserve Liberty-A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. KY.L. REV. 63, at 74
n. 53 (1982). This classical source is particularly relevant because it is invoked directly
by thinkers and writers of the revolutionary period. In his work, A Defence of the
Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, John Adams enlisted
similar writings by Aristotle:
One consequence [of armed citizens was] . . . "that nothing could at any time be
imposed upon the people but by their consent .. " As Aristotle tells us, in his
fourth book on Politics, the Grecian states ever had special care to place the use
and exercise of arms in the people, because the commonwealth is theirs who hold
the arms: the sword and sovereignty ever walk hand in hand together.
3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTrrTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA 471-72 (London, 1787-88), cited in Halbrook, supra note 48, at 66.
93. (London 1787-88). cited in HALBROOK, supra note 48, at 14.
94. (1656), cited in HALBROOK, supra note 48, at 14.
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commonwealth is theirs who hold the arms: the sword and sovereignty
95
ever walk hand in hand together."

English libertarian writers, who strongly influenced the political
views of colonial Americans, reflected the same sentiment. 96 Andrew
Fletcher, writing several decades before the American revolution,
warned: "he that is armed, is always master of the purse of him that is
97
unarmed."
The theoretical alternative to government, 98 Locke's state of nature,
suggests that citizens really do have and should continue to have a
choice about the structure of government or its very existence. We could
envision a phase where collective controls and security mechanisms
would be dismantled by choice. 99 In the event this course is chosen, the
absence of some of the essential tools for defense, necessary for
proceeding into the subsequent period, might at least temporarily
impede the decision to move forward. 100
G. Should Government Fearthe Citizenry?
While the answer is unclear, we might ask whether our
constitutional structure includes a presumption that those with direct
control of collective power should have a healthy respect for and fear of
the citizens who placed them in that position. It might be systemically
healthy and necessary that our representatives fear not only being voted
out of office, but also that some exercises of the power entrusted to
them will be resisted by individuals with the will and the means to do
SO.
This idea does not rely heavily on the progression into violent
conflict. Instead, it focuses on the restraining effect of the fear that
certain intrusions on individual rights might trigger opposition by force.
Absent this deterrent, intrusions on individual liberty might occur more
95. 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITLrrIONS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 471-72 (London 1787-88), cited in HALBROOK, supra note 48, at 14.
96. See Shalhope, supra note 72, at 601.
97. ANDREW FLETCHER, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF ANDREW FLETCHER, ESQ. 9 (London
1737) at 9, cited in Shalhope, supra note 72, at 603.
98. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 5-6 (Gateway 1964).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 244-45.
100. Although it is difficult to imagine the political path that would lead to the
withdrawal of that consent, one would expect a consensual model to allow the retention of
tools essential in the wake of such a massive structural change.
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easily, particularly where there is a strong conviction that the intrusion is
necessary to make governing easier.
It has been argued that the vision of government servants being
fearful of overstepping their power was an element of the framers'
vision. James Burgh, in a work very popular in pre-revolutionary
America, argued that the impending conflict was a product of ignoring
the principles that support an armed population. He urged that "there is
no end to observations on the difference between the measures likely to
be pursued by a minister backed by a standing army and those of a
court awed by the fear of an armed people."'10 1 Libertarian writers John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon also considered fear of the armed
citizen to be an important check on intrusive government. In language
representative of this commentary, they posit: "men that are above all
Fear, soon grow above all Shame." 102
Absent the some real fear of the citizenry, limitations on the exercise
of the power delegated to government are mainly rhetorical. 10 3 These
limitations may be cold comfort, particularly to individuals or groups
that have been ill-served by them in the past.
H. The Framers' View of IndividualArms
A large body of literature, distilled primarily by Second
Amendment scholars, reflects and seems to have influenced the
101. See Hardy, Armed Citizens, supra note 26, at 586 (citing 2 JAMES BURGH,
POLITICAL DISQUISMONS: AN ENQUIREY INTO PUBLIC ERRORS, DEFECTS AND ABUSES 475-76
(London 1971) (1774)).
102. See Shalhope, supra note 72, at 603 (citing JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS
GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS OR ESSAYS ON LiBERTY, CwIL & RELIGIOUS AND OTHER IMPORTANT
SUBJECTS 189, 255 (London 1755)).

103. See Hardy, Armed Citizens, supra note 26, at 586.
Compare Stephen Halbrook, To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoptions of
the Second Amendment 1787-1791, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 13 (1982). Halbrook writes:
Another source of power in government is a military force .... Before a standing
army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are in almost every kingdom
in Europe. The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword;
because the whole body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior to
any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretence, raised in the United
States.
Id. at 16-17 (quoting Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the
Federal Constitution, PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 56 (P. Ford
ed., 1888)).
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framers' perceptions about the role of individual arms in the American
constitutional system. 10 4 It conspicuously includes the writings of John
Locke, 105 and Locke is in remarkable company.
The Federalist Papers directly support derivation of an individual
right to arms for self-defense from the Ninth Amendment. Federalist
No. 28 describes an "original right to self-defense which is paramount
to all positive forms of government."' 106 Several commentators have
urged that certain rights predate government, and the Ninth Amendment
preserves them. 10 7 The difficulty is in determining which preexisting
rights are so preserved. Hamilton offers at least one indication that a
right to possess arms for self-defense was considered among. such
inalienable rights even if it did not find its way explicitly into the Bill of
Rights.
Blackstone's commentaries are particularly relevant given their
influence on the Supreme Court's incorporation of provisions of the Bill
of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Benton v.
Maryland,108 the Court explained its test for incorporation. The Court
noted that the provision at issue, the prohibition of double jeopardy "as
with many other elements of the common law,... was carried into the
jurisprudence of this country through the medium of Blackstone, who
codified the doctrine in his Commentaries." ' 109
Blackstone viewed the right to bear arms as pre-existing
government. He declared that "self-defense, therefore, as it is, justly
called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact,
taken away by the law of society." 110 He described a right to arms as
both statutory and natural. 11
104. One Second Amendment scholar offers a notable list of political philosophers
and thinkers, who appear to have considered the right to arms for individual defense
essential. The list includes: Aristotle, Machiavelli, Sir Thomas Moore, Hobbes, James
Harrington, Cicero, Sidney, Trenchard, Tousseau, Sir Walter Raleigh, Blackstone,
Nedham, Montesquieu, and Becacaria. Kates, OriginalMeaning, supra note 2, at 232-33.
105. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 127 (Alexander Hamilton) (George Macy Co. ed.,
1945).
107. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
108. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
109. Id. at 795.
110. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 4 ((U. Chi.
Press photo. reprint 1979) (1st ed. 1765-69).
111. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND * 143-44 (1766), cited
in HALBROOK, supra note 48, at 54.
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John Adams's position on the right to bear arms is also notable,
because he opposed the establishment of a right to bear arms
collectively to achieve political ends. One commentator proposes that it
was natural for Adams, an aristocrat, to oppose the concept of a
citizens' militia; 112 however, even Adams endorsed individual arms
113
ownership for private self-defense.
Thomas Hobbes's work is frequently cited by Second Amendment
commentators to support an individual right interpretation. Because
Hobbes is generally viewed as laying a foundation for absolute
monarchy, it is telling that even he advocated an individual right to selfdefense: "A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is
alwayes voyd. For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or
lay down his Right to save himselfe from Death." 114
The impact of these sources in explaining the Second Amendment
may be diverted by the fact that there is explicit text to interpret. Even if
we are not convinced by Second Amendment scholars' arguments, the
evidence they have gathered will not disappear. The support these
sources offer takes on greater significance when the individual right to
arms is viewed through the Ninth Amendment. The plethora of
historical support suggests that deriving an individual right to arms
from the Ninth Amendment may be substantially easier than deriving
other popularly advocated rights. 115 If we take the Ninth Amendment
seriously, and we believe we can derive rights from it in an objective,
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subjects, that I shall at present mention, is
that of having arms for their defence suitable to their condition and degree, and
such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute ... and it is
indeed, a public allowance under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance
and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.
In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the
liberties of Englishmen . . . . [T]o vindicate these rights, when actually violated
or attacked, the subjects of England are entitled . . . to the right of having and
using arms for self-preservation and defense.
Id. (emphasis added).
112. HALBROOK, supra note 48, at 66.
113. 'To suppose arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual discretion,
except in private self-defence ...is a dissolution of the government." Id. (quoting ADAMS,
supra note 92, at 475).
114. Hardy, Historiography,supra note 26, at 31 (citing HOBBES, supra note 57, at
116).
115. See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
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apolitical fashion, then we must thoughtfully consider the implications
there
of endorsing more trendy unenumerated rights while denying that
116
is a principled basis for establishing an individual right to arms.
L The Implications of a Decision that the Citizenry Cannotbe Trusted
with PersonalWeapons.
A practical rationale supporting disarmament is that some citizens
cannot be trusted to act wisely or prudently in their use of firearms. This
justification, though, raises the related question: can such a population
be entrusted to make informed democratic decisions? Once we reach
the stage where we advocate individual disarmament, we may have
departed substantially from the framers' design-so substantially that,
perhaps, we will no longer seriously be able to contend that government
is either controlled by and serves citizens in a way that is responsive and
accountable, or that citizens possess the capacity 117to meet their
responsibility as masters of their agents in government.
VI. PERSONAL SECURITY, UTILITY OF FIREARMS AND THREATS
In this section, I will examine the case for individual arms by
pursuing a more fundamental and less controversial issue: whether we
at least can derive a constitutionally protected interest in personal
security from the Ninth Amendment. I will then examine the utility of
firearms in protecting such an interest and the threats to individual
security that might justify the perception that a meaningful right to
personal security may require individual access to firearms.

116. The American Civil Liberties Union's opinion on the meaning of the Second
Amendment is that "[e]xcept for lawful police and military purposes, the possession of
weapons by individuals is not constitutionally protected." Levinson, supra note 2, at 644
(citing ACLU, POLICY ON GUN CONTROL #47 (1989)). It is not clear whether such a policy
would translate as well into a position that the Ninth Amendment protects unenumerated
rights, but an individual right to arms for self defense is not among them.
117. See Kates Original Meaning, supra note 2, at 233. Kates notes that the
Founders believed that if the population ever were unfit to possess arms, it would be only
because they would have been degraded by exploitation and oppression. The people we
seem most intent on disarming may fit well into this category.
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A. PersonalSecurity as a FundamentalInterest
A predominant reason to protect a right to self-defense and personal
security is that such an interest may be a prerequisite to exercising and
enjoying those rights that are explicitly enumerated. The dead probably
have very little use for the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Writings that have contributed to our political and constitutional
tradition confirm the idea that individual security and self-defense are
basic and natural human concerns. 118 American colonists viewed selfdefense not just as a right but as an obligation. 119 St. George Tucker,
whose supplemented edition of Blackstone's Commentaries compared
the American Constitution and law to British common law, 120 observed
that "[t]he right of self defence is the first law of nature." 12 1 The
corresponding right to arms in the English tradition was expanded in
American law. 122
Other modem writers find support in the work of early nineteenth
124
century commentators 123 and an array of state court decisions.
118.

E.g.,

CICERO,

In Defence of Titus Annius Milo, reprinted in SELECTED

POLITICAL SPEECHES OF CICERO 213 (Michael Grant trans., 1969). Cicero noted:

[T]here exists a law, not written down anywhere but inborn in our hearts .... I
refer to the law which lays it down that, if our lives are endangered by plots or
violence or armed robbers or enemies, any and every method of protecting
ourselves is morally right. When weapons reduce them to silence, the laws no
longer expect one to await their pronouncements. For people who decide to wait
for these will have to wait for justice too-and meanwhile they must suffer
injustice first.
Id. at 222.
119. Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 2, at 229-30. Kates offers the following
quotation from a 1747 Philadelphia sermon in support:
He that suffers his life to be taken from him by one that hath no authority for that
purpose, when he might preserve it by defense, incurs the Guilt of self murder
since God hath enjoined him to seek the continuance of his life, and Nature itself
teaches every creature to defend himself ....
Id. at 230 n.109 (citation omitted).
120. Hardy, Armed Citizens, supra note 26, at 612 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS 300 (St.
George Tucker ed., 1803)).
121. Id. at 613 n.263.
122. Id.
123. See Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 177, 183 (1982). The authors write:
The right of self-defence in these cases is founded in the law of nature, and is not,
nor can be, superseded by any law of society. For before societies were
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Nelson Lund argues: "[i]n liberal theory, the right to self-defense is the
most fundamental of all rights-far more basic than the guarantees of
free speech, freedom of religion, jury trial, and due process of law." 125
David Caplan presents a selection of early English common law
endorsements including some drawing on biblical passages and others
126
derived from the self-defense doctrine in criminal law.
Early Supreme Court jurisprudence provides another endorsement
of the constitutional right to individual security. In one case, the Court
ruled that "constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction
deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of
the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. ' 127 Some
forty years later, in a widely noted dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis
argued passionately in support of an unenumerated, but fundamental,
right to privacy that encompassed a right to personal security. 128
At least one modem commentator has considered several human
rights principles incorporated into international law as relevant to
determining those rights that the Ninth Amendment protects. 129 The
formed .... the right of self-defence resided in individuals; it could not reside
elsewhere, and since in cases of necessity, individuals incorporated into society
cannot resort for protection to the law of the society, that law with great propriety
and strict justice considereth them, as still, in that instance, under the protection
of the law of nature.
Id. (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 210 (listing a number of recent state court cases recognizing a natural or
fundamental right to self preservation).
125. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty and the Right to SelfPreservation,39 ALA. L. REv. 103, 118 (1987).
126. Caplan, supra note 27, at 803-11. See also Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 123,
at 183.
127. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (holding seizure or
compulsory production of private papers to be violative of personal security and, hence,
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
128. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (remembered as a plea
for constitutional recognition of a "right to be left alone").
129. See Moore, supra note 36, at 301. Moore notes:
Perhaps the most viable area to which we can look for guidance in determining
what are the natural rights of man protected by the Ninth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution is to the International Community of Nations and to what
generally has been admitted to be, by the International Community of Nations,
fundamental rights of men. Certainly, when many different countries from all
areas of the world, with representatives of all different religious, social and
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United Nations Charter declares that "nothing in the charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense ....,,130 The
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights also explicitly
endorses the right of individual security, stating that "[e]veryone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person." 131
Similar writings considering the inherent right of self-defense
abound, 132 bolstered by an array of non-traditional sources. Work in the
political persuasions, can agree on a proclamation as to what are certain
fundamental rights of all human beings, this would be a strong indication that
these are fundamental natural rights that all men possess by their very nature ....
The most single centralized recognized source of what the International
Community of Nations believes to be the fundamental natural rights of man is the
Universal Declaration of Human rights proclaimed by the United Nations.
Id.
130. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
131. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. Doe.
A/810, at 71 (1948), discussed in James B. Whisker, Historical Development and
Subsequent Erosion of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 171 n.52
(1976). See also Proclamation of Teheran U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
32/41 (1968). The Proclamation was adopted unanimously by a group of sovereign
nations, including the United States, at the conclusion of the 1968 International
Conference on Human Rights. It binds the endorsing nations to the implementation of the
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id. Article 9 of
that Covenant states that "[e]veryone has the right to security of person." International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, G.A. Res 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966).
132. Various other sources, predating and contemporaneous with the drafting of the
Constitution, recognize that the basic human interest in personal security (sometimes
expressed generally and other times in direct connection with a right to arms) must fall
within the first of their rights that are fundamental attributes of free people. See, e.g.,
CICERO, supra note 118, at 222; GEORG JELLINEK, THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN
AND OF CITIZENS 49 (M. Farrand trans., 1901) (The only individual rights contained in the
English Bill of Rights were the right to petition and the right to bear arms.); GEORGE C.
NEUMANN, THE HISTORY OF WEAPONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 150-51 (1967) ("In
America it was considered normal for eighteenth century civilians to carry pocket pistols
for protection while traveling."); Dowlut and Knoop, supra note 123, at 163 ("The
foundation of an Englishman's security, 'the security without which every other would
have been insufficient' was neither Magna Carta nor Parliament but 'the power of the
sword."'); Gardiner, supra note 92, at 67 (The right and positive duty of self-defense
existed in English law prior to the formation of the American Republic: "This duty is
illustrated by the manumission ceremonies in which the former master of a liberated serf
would place in his hands the weapons of a freeman as a symbol of his new stature."); Alan
Gottlieb, Gun Ownership: A Constitutional Right, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 113, 127 (1982)
("[C]olonial Americans depended primarily upon the great commentators for their
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social sciences presents formally what may drive attitudes about selfdefense. It has been observed as a rather natural phenomenon that
people take steps to protect themselves when their faith in the ability of
133
agencies such as the police to protect them diminishes.
Acknowledging the premise that our constitutional structure is grounded
in the distrust of government, we might expect citizens to exhibit a
continuing interest in acquiring instruments of self-protection. While
constitutional questions will not turn on such observations, they partially
confirm the proposition that disarmament requires taking a political
step-trusting in the competence and benevolence of government-that
should make us uncomfortable.
It is useful in comparison to examine some representative
statements regarding macro security issues. Oscar Schachter's SelfDefense and the Rule of Law 134 offers a useful point of departure.
Schachter describes two schools of thought regarding views of the right
of self-defense in the international sphere. The first parallels what I have
presented as support for the individual right of self-defense, that self-

knowledge of fundamental common law principles. From Sir Edward Coke they learned
that one of those fundamental principles was the individual's right to possess arms for
defense of his home and family."); Halbrook, supra note 103, at 22 ("The government is
only just and perfectly free ... where there is also a dernier resort, or real power left in the
community to defend themselves against any attack on their liberties."); Stephen P.
Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the First State Bills of Rights, 10 VT. L. REv. 225,
270 (1985) (quoting an article from the Pa. Evening Post 1776: "The inhibition of
bearing Arms has ever been deemed, through all the Nations of the World, the most
flagitious Characteristic of abject Slavery!"); Hardy, Historiography,supra note 26, at 18
("Most of our Bill of Rights are, in short, of quite recent vintage . . . .Conversely, a
specifically individual right to arms, separate and apart from the militia system, was one
of the earliest of the individual civil rights to gain acceptance .... In fact, the origins of
the concept of an individual right to arms lies not in the eighteenth century
Enlightenment, but in the turmoil of the seventeenth century."); Hardy, Armed Citizens,
supra note 26, at 586. "The possession of arms is the distinction between a freeman and a
slave.") (citation omitted); Stuart Hays, The Right to Bear Arms: A Study in Judicial
Misinterpretation,2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381, 383 (1960) ("From the very beginnings
of early 'England' the Saxons, Angles, Picts, Jutes, and other tribal factions possessed
weapons for ...self-defense."); Levin, supra note 82, at 161 ("Most state courts have
never spoken of the right to bear arms in the sophisticated terms of political balance, but
rather treated the right as synonymous with the right of self defense.").
133. David McDowall and Colin Loftin, Collective Security and the Demand for
Legal Handguns, 88 AM. J. Soc., 1146-61 (1983).
134. Oscar Schachter, Self Defense & The Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259
(1989).
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preservation "is a natural right of the state, as of individuals, that could
not be abrogated or limited by positive law." 135
The second is rather remarkable when considered against
contemporary American views of the individual right to self-defense. It
is the belief in the subordination of law to power when national security
is threatened. 136 Schachter presents the remarks of Dean Acheson,
former Secretary of State, in a discussion of the legality of the U.S.
quarantine of Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis: "[t]he action taken
by the United States was, in [Acheson's] view, 'essential to the
continuation of [its] preeminent power.' Law, he declared, simply does
not deal with such questions of ultimate power ....The survival of
states is not a matter of law.' ' 137 Although when it has been in our
national interest we have endorsed the opposite view, 138 the United
States has argued before the International Court of Justice that "the
United States alone was in a position to determine the necessity of the
'defense' measures it had taken against Nicaragua ...,,139
On a macro level, issues of security and survival of the state are
considered qualitatively different from other issues that might more
easily be submitted to the consensus of the community. What is
obscured in the analysis of individual interests in security and selfdefense is boldly apparent when it is the security of the state itself at
issue: an autonomous state's interest in its continued existence is
preeminent among its concerns, and measures it takes to ensure its
survival will not be subordinated to community limitations.
I suspect many of us are not yet prepared to say that an individual's
interest in security is of less importance than the state's. In order to
endorse disarmament, we must face directly the conflict between
accepted views of the state's interest in security and self-defense and an
135. Id. at 259.
136. Id. at 260.
137. Id. at 259.
138. Id. at 261-62. The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg rejected the
argument by Nazi leaders that "Germany had acted in self-defense and that every state must
be the judge of whether in a given case it has the right of self-defense." Id.
139. Id. at 200. On another level, the United States' potential for violence permits
it to comply or not with the rules established by the community of nations. The
declarations of international law that the United States has ignored when it is in the
national interest to do so give us a contemporary appreciation of the possibility that total
reliance on "parchment barriers" to restrain the actions of the state toward individual
citizens is unwise.
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individual's constitutional right to armed personal security. If we
perceive government as a means to an end rather than an end in itself,
then we should be troubled by the idea that the government's interest in
perpetuating itself is more legitimate than the corresponding interest of
individual citizens. 14 0
The same observation applies to the special provisions made for the
security of individuals who rise to power within government. It is
doubtful that disarmament would require all government agents to
depend on the same collective security resources as private citizens.
Certainly, we could posit reasons for permitting certain agents of
government to have armed security personnel at their constant disposal
or even personal access to firearms. Indeed, it would be difficult to
argue that these measures were not justified and necessary.
What is difficult to justify is permitting government agents, whom
we ideally characterize as servants, to enjoy a level of security, provided
in part by firearms, unavailable to the general population. 14 1 Such a
140. It is useful to compare the treatment by scholars and media of national security
issues with their treatment of individual security issues. The most powerful members of our
political elite attend to and are involved in the treatment of collective security issues.
Such issues attract the energy of some of our best minds. See, e.g., AMERICA'S SECURITY IN
TM 1980's (Christopher Bertram ed., 1982) (including essays from Henry Kissinger and
Barbara Tuchman).
Our popular press coverage of weapons of immense destruction demonstrates
significant interest in their capabilities and operation, as illustrated by the extensive
coverage that familiarized us in detail with the weapons used in Operation Desert Storm. In
sharp contrast, despite the fact that individuals in our society consistently are threatened
with violence it is difficult to find any serious evaluation of individual defense
mechanisms other than in forums that many consider outside the mainstream. See, e.g.,
GUNS AND AMMO (magazine); HANDGUNS (magazine). One certainly finds few political or
intellectual luminaries discussing individual defense tactics using personal firearms.
141. Even if we presume that the collective security resources are administered on
an absolutely equal basis, we still have a problem. DeTocqueville urged that there is a
fundamental conflict between liberty and equality. See, KING, supra note 83. We have
managed this conflict by attempting only to guarantee equal opportunity to individuals to
exercise their liberty to achieve what they choose. Consistent with DeTocqueville's
concerns we seem to resist guarantees of equal outcomes; however, general disarmament,
even if administered evenly, would equalize not only opportunities, but also outcomes. It
would place us, with respect to a fundamental human concern which many approach
differently, on absolutely equal ground.
Because disarmament restricts our liberty to make individual decisions about how to
defend our own lives, it is in conflict with our rejection of coerced limitations on
individual liberty in favor of the interest in equality. In making this decision, we ought-to
consider how we can so forcefully resist mandated equalization of outcomes where simple
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result leads to the conclusion that those in positions of power in
government are distinct from servants whose lives are somehow worth
more than the lives of citizens. It then follows that our constitutional
system is designed to tolerate a tier of elite whose interest in personal
security exceeds that of citizens merely because of their positions in
government. 142 Our constitutional tradition, based on the concepts of
limited government serving the citizenry and legitimate fear of the
power vested in government, seems at odds with such conclusions.
It is then possible to view physical security as preeminent among
those things necessary to enjoyment of enumerated guarantees, and it is
important that we scrutinize the potential role of firearms in protecting
that interest.
B.

The Utility of Firearmsfor PersonalSecurity

One might concede that an individual's interest in physical security
is recognized generally in the Constitution and particularly by the Ninth
Amendment but still resist the idea that it may be pursued by force of
arms. One way to justify this position is to deny the utility of firearms
as tools for resisting violence.
There is little dispute that firearms, at least in the hands of the police
and the military, are useful. When the issue changes to arms in the
hands of individual citizens, there is a detectable transformation of
economic issues are at stake, and yet embrace it when evaluating an individual's interest in
protecting against threats to his life. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
142. Compare the following perspective:
Only admit the original unalterable truth, that all men are equal in their rights, and
the foundation of everything is laid; to build the superstructure requires no effort
but that of natural deduction. The first necessary deduction will be, that the people
will form an equal representative government . . . . Another deduction follows,
[t]hat the people will be universally armed . . . . A people that legislate for
themselves ought to be in the habit of protecting themselves; or they will lose
the spirit of both.
JOEL BERLOW, ADVICE TO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF EUROPE 46-47

(Great Seal Books 1956) (1792).
It is not unreasonable to expect individual citizens to look skeptically on public
officials who enjoy security measures that they would vote to deny individual citizens.
See, e.g., Random Shots, AM. RIFLEMAN, April 1991, at 20 (identifying Stephen Solarz
and Teddy Kennedy as consistently opposing individual arms ownership while their body
guards have been arrested on Capital Hill for weapons violations (toting 9mm
semiautomatic pistols and sub-machineguns respectively)). See also James J. Baker, Gun
Legislation, SHOOTING TIMES, Feb. 1991, at 6.
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perception. Suddenly, there is nothing useful or socially beneficial about
them. This sentiment is illustrated by Professor Levinson's observation
that "it appears almost crazy to protect as a constitutional right
something that so clearly results in extraordinary social costs with little,
143
if any, compensating social advantage."
This extraordinary social cost arises from the fact that guns are
effective tools for killing people and are used for that purpose. It is,
however, an analytical misstep to assume that every use of firearms is at
a social cost. Many of us would count the use of a policeman's gun to
stop aggression against an innocent victim as a benefit rather than a cost.
Some of us would reach the same conclusion about a victim using a
gun directly in self-defense. Given the fairly widespread justified,
defensive use of firearms in our country, we can at least argue about
whether guns are useful security tools. 144
Some may be inclined to dismiss the possibility of individuals
beneficially using tools of violence. The explanation may lie in the
conviction that all violence is simply abhorrent and ought never be

143. Levinson, supra note 2, at 655. Certainly, it is a powerful indictment that any
activity contributes to innocent lives being lost. It would be devastating if we were
comparing the utility of only 24,000 guns in our society against the damage of their use
in the 24,000 firearms related murders during 1986 and 1987. Id.
Since more than 70 million Americans own guns and there are over 165 million of
them in private hands, a different result emerges. JAMES WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GuN 85
(1983). One now has to take into consideration eliminating a choice made by millions of
citizens. Additionally, given the fractional percentage of these millions of guns that are
abused, one might inquire whether the presence of guns in our society is the predominant
cause of these murders or the murders would have occurred by other means absent the
availability of a firearm.
Objective assessment of the utility of arms seems to require something that we may
be uncomfortable doing. It makes us consider that the use of firearms by victims to stop
aggressors may indeed be a net benefit, even where the aggressor is killed. In more stark
terms, the question is whether a gun in the hands of Goodman, Chaney, the central park
jogger, the L.A. trucker or a host of others might have been a positive and useful thing.
144. Gary Kleck, Crime Control Through Private Use of Armed Force, 35 SOC.
PROBS. 1 (Feb. 1988) (arguing that yearly there are nearly 650,000 protective uses of
handguns by civilians). Dr. Paul Blackman places this figure at one million per year for all
guns. Paul H. Blackman, Gun Legislation, AM. HANDGUNNER, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 22. See
also The Armed Citizen, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1991, at 6; NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION,
THE ARMED CmZEN (1983). My point is not to rely on the accuracy of these figures, but to
indicate that an armed citizen might achieve the same result that we would not criticize if it
were the work of an armed government agent.
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condoned. 145 James Payne made a similar observation in an analysis of
macro security issues in terms that parallel the phenomenon at the micro
level:
In modern Western culture, the two views of war, the negative and the
positive, are not given equal weight. What dominates, especially in
literary and academic circles, is the view of war as wasteful and
repugnant. There have been moments in the life of a country when
fighting-that is, war-has been seen as desirable, but these are hardly
noticed and never clearly remembered. What prevails, until practically
the moment comes to fight again, is the view of war as evil, as
something never willfully chosen by right-thinking leaders.
This one-sided perspective has a broad impact on efforts to study
military forces and levels of military preparedness. With the "bad" face
of war dominating the picture, military forces are not seen as something a
nation might usefully have, as it would have agencies devoted to
education or to caring for parks. Instead, military forces are treated as a
vice, something the nation ought not to have but which, owing to some
obscure appetite, it cannot stop itself from acquiring. In this perspective,
all military forces are deplorable, and there is no such thing as a normal,
nonalarming level of military preparations.
A typical expression of this view is found in Salvador de Madariaga's
classic Disarmament,written in 1929. "Save vice," he declared, "nothing
is as wasteful in the world as war and the preparation for it."
Military forces are productive. In the right circumstances,
thoughtful, moral individuals will want to have them and will want to use
them on behalf of national purposes. For example, when military forces
are needed to combat an aggressor bent on destroying a nation and its
people, they are certainly doing something very useful indeed. In fact,
they are probably carrying on an activity far more productive than that of
school teachers or park wardens, for example, for were they to fail in
146
their mission, neither schools nor parks might remain.

145. Gun advocates argue that the firearms debate does not weigh the protective use
of firearms against the instances of firearms abuse. See Kleck, supra note 142; AM.
RIFLEMAN, (July 1989), at 6.
Those who would condone police use of deadly force and yet condemn a defensive
shooting by a private citizen seem to be saying that it is uncivilized for citizens to take
such actions directly. But is it a mark of civilization or hypocrisy to delegate distasteful
tasks to government? To the degree that we detach ourselves from such things and pretend
we are above them, it is probably closer to hypocrisy. One wonders whether we would
make better social decisions if we delegated such things less and moved toward sharing
rather than abdicating responsibility for unpleasant tasks.
146. JAMEs L. PAYNE, WHY NATIONs ARM 9 (1989).
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The parallels between Payne's observations 147 and those that can be
made about the gun debate are instructive. From the perspective that all
violence is abhorrent, we can more easily embrace the assumptions and
make the denials required to justify individual disarmament. 148 We can

147. What Payne offers as a truth, denied by many contemporary intellectuals, was
submitted as uncontroversial by thirteenth century scholar Henry de Bracton:
But whether it be armed force or unarmed force, all such force is not injurious,
because some arms are used for protection; and what a person may do for
protection of his own person or of his own right he seems to have done justly.
Likewise there are arms of peace and of justice, and arms of disturbance of peace
and of injustice. There are likewise arms of usurpation of another's property, and
such force may be called ablative, whence it will be allowable to him, who justly
possesses, to repel with arms any one coming with arms against the peace [of the
realm] to expel him, that by the arms of self-protection and of peace, which are
the arms of justice, he may repel injury and unjust violence and arms of injury; but
nevertheless with the moderation of such discretion, that he does not cause an
injury, for he may not under such pretext kill a man, or wound him, or ill-treat
him, if he can in any other way protect his possession. And therefore against him,
who wishes to use his strength, he may resist with his utmost strength, with arms
or without, according to the saying, when a strong man armed, & c ....
4 HENRy DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET. CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE f. 162b (T. Twiss trans.,
1880), cited in Caplan, supra note 27, at 804.
Perhaps a remarkable idea, at least in some contemporary circles, is the recognition
in a Michigan Supreme Court decision that peaceful citizens might not only properly
possess weapons for defense, but also for "pleasure." People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245,
247 (Mich. 1931) (the challenged statute was upheld because it did not ban "ordinary guns,
swords, revolvers, or other weapons usually relied upon by good citizens for defense or
pleasure.").
Ironically, the use of arms for pleasure instead of protection has been legitimized at
the regulatory and legislative level. Recently, enacted and proposed legislation and
executive orders have focused on whether particular guns have a legitimate sporting use as
a basis for determining their legitimacy for private possession. See H.R. 993, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). It may be this limited and arguably inverted view of the utility of
weapons ownership that has led to the conviction that "it appears almost crazy to protect
as a constitutional right something that so clearly results in extraordinary social costs
with little, if any, compensating social advantage." Levinson, supra note 2, at 655.
If we abandon the concept of legitimate sporting use and posit that using guns for fun
and sport is subject to less constitutional protection than using them for self-defense,
then we close the door on arguments that would ban "military style" weapons while
tolerating those considered appropriate for hunting or target shooting.
148. Plainly, all guns have the capability to kill. The basic objection to individual
gun ownership is not that guns look scary, but that. they can be used to kill people. It is
difficult to see how anyone whose analysis stops here would be satisfied just eliminating
the scary-looking ones. Because all guns are deadly weapons, it is hard to take seriously
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reject the possibility that resistance in kind, a concept at the core of
police response to violent aggressors, can be an effective response to
violent threats; that the threat of retaliation has some impact on the
calculations of potential aggressors (including those ostensibly
representing the collective will); that collective security measures cannot
quell a threat at the very instant it emerges; and that force or the threat of
force works to achieve various collective objectives or has a short term
impact on human behavior.
Keeping in mind this possible analytical impairment, it is essential
to consider the utility of guns not for sporting use, but for protection
against violent threats. Although we may not feel comfortable about it,
we regularly sanction the use of deadly force against violent aggressors.
That agents of government, to whom many would completely entrust
their lives, have access to and use of firearms which citizens cannot
lawfully purchase is a testament to this fact. 149
Historically, violence has been an important tool, substantially
impacting conflict resolution. 150 This recognition is reflected in the
writings of the framers and the works on which much of their political
philosophy was grounded. During the ratification debates, Patrick
any commitment to preserving the "good ones," whether for sporting purposes or
personal protection.
149. It may surprise some that private citizens may still own machine guns. See 27
C.F.R. §§ 178, 179 (1991). There exists a similar exception for ownership of certain
prohibited assault rifles by law enforcement agencies and privately acting police officers.
It may not be difficult to determine the type of weapon that should be constitutionally
protected. At a minimum, the gauge of usefulness might be those weapons police choose
as suitable for protection of officers in confrontations with criminals. Indeed, if one
distrusts government or considers an individual's interest in self-preservation to be as
important as collective interests, then one might conclude that individual citizens should
be permitted to own the same type of weapons carried by the police.
150. Our national boundaries and the history of our encounters with indigenous
people attest to this fact. Possibly the final option in every conflict is violence, with the
party who is prepared to prevail at that stage holding an advantage in all that precedes it.
The advantage looms greater with a larger disparity in the parties' capability and appetite
for violence.
A notable illustration of this phenomenon on a macro level is the interaction and
negotiations between pre-World War II Germany and Great Britain. In his biography of
Winston Churchill, William Manchaster describes in fascinating detail the weakened
negotiating posture of the British resulting first from Neville Chamberlin's unwavering
appeasement and pacifism and second from the eventual substantial military advantage
developed by the Germans. See WILLIAM MANCHASTER, WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, THE
LAST LION, ALONE (1932-1940) passim (Dell 1988).
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Henry wrote: "[g]uard with jealous attention the public liberty. Suspect
everyone who approaches that jewel. Unfortunately, nothing will
preserve it but downright force. Whenever you give up that force, you
are inevitably ruined." 151
One facet of the contemporary debate is our expectation about the
dynamics of violence. One might presume that the likelihood of
violence increases when there is an imbalance of power. The imbalance
operates as an incentive for the aggressor to use what he considers a
prevailing level of force. Therefore, aggressors will victimize those who
are weaker than themselves. This idea directly affects our presumptions
about the impact of the free availability of guns in our society.
It may be that much of the random, senseless violence we
experience is a result not of too many guns, but of too few in the hands
of peaceful citizens. Some random, seemingly knee-jerk violence
appears to stem from the expectation that the consequences will be
insignificant. One reason is that at the instant of the violent criminal act,
even in a world where police protection is generally adequate, police
cannot always be present to deter the threat. A related expectation of the
aggressor may be that his victim will be basically defenseless and
therefore a relatively risk-free target.
For the very reason that many fear them-the ease with which they
unleash deadly force-guns equalize power relationships. Individuals
generally are more equal in their capabilities to point and shoot than they
are in physical attributes of strength, girth or speed. This may mean that
a victim facing a single aggressor or multiple aggressors is better off
armed, even if his attackers also are armed.
Wendy Brown's example, illustrating why she opposes an armed
citizenry, is useful. She describes an encounter in a national park with a
pornography-reading, beer-guzzling, Winnebago-driving hunter, who
assisted her in starting her stalled car, but who she feared might rape
her. 152 She argues that had he and his two friends decided to attack, his
gun might have made the difference between her resisting with her
"hard won self-defense skills" 15 3 or succumbing to the attack.
Changing the scenario only slightly yields a conclusion at odds with
Professor Brown's. In the society she argues is preferable, assume that
151. 4 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES 167, 380 (July 29, 1788), cited in Gottlieb, supra note
132, at 124.
152. Brown, supra note 37, at 665-66.
153. Id.
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Professor Brown's attacker, so far as firearm's restrictions go, is lawabiding and disarmed. But assuming where the crime of rape is
concerned, he and his two friends are not law-abiding, we might wish
that Professor Brown possessed a tool that would equalize the power
relationship sufficiently to dissuade or stop the rapists.
Even if some or all of the three aggressors are armed and Professor
Brown is armed, applying the principle (common in macro security
analysis) that increasing the cost of violence decreases its likelihood,
Professor Brown would be better off armed than if she and her attackers
all were disarmed. In the disarmed scenario, the disincentive to the three
rapists is a potential kick or punch. In the armed scenario each has to
contemplate the possibility that he will be killed. This raises the cost of
aggression and decreases the probability that the attack will occur.
One is not forced to operate purely in the realm of hypotheticals in
evaluating this issue. The Mexican experience offers some basis for
anticipating whether disarmament means that candidates for
victimization will be better off:
The Western country with the highest per capita homicide rate is not the
United States, but Mexico, where only the wealthy and the influential are
permitted handguns. The per capita Mexican knife homicide rate is three
times greater than the American rate for all kinds of homicides. Perhaps
Mexico would have more homicides if handguns were available, although
criminological evidence indicates that a potential murderer is fully as
154
deadly with a knife as with a gun.

The Mexican experience generates several considerations. The first
is whether disarmament will suddenly cause those intent on violent
aggression to become peaceful citizens. We can fairly expect that the
spark which generates violence will not be extinguished by even
successful disarmament. 155 Tendencies toward violence might well
continue, with the difference being that the effectiveness of tools used
depends on the strength, dexterity or ruthlessness of the user. Under
154.

Don B. Kates, Jr., Why a Civil Libertarian Opposes Gun Control, THE CIV.

LIBERTIEs REV., June/July 1976.

155. If we even suspect that taking individuals' last line of defense against violent
threats conflicts with our constitutional principles, then we might appropriately require
much more than a transient statistical extrapolation, suggesting that disarmament will
reduce deaths. We might subject to greater scrutiny the unfortunately hackneyed
justification "if it saves just one life its worth it." That is, after all, a justification that can
be applied as easily to arming as to disarming. See generally Kleck, supra note 144.
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those circumstances, the physically weak and the squeamish would be
left without tools capable of equalizing the power relationship between
them and violent aggressors. This would leave them particularly reliant
on government, locked and barred in their homes for their personal
security.

156

I have drawn another example from a conversation sometime ago
with a friend. She lives in an affluent area, in a nice home with a
sophisticated security system. We discussed her revelation that she was
thinking about purchasing a gun. At the core of her concern was "what
if some one got in here and got to me before the police arrived."
There were a number of responses: that the probability of such an
event was low; that there was a danger that she would shoot someone
accidentally; that there was high quality, responsive police protection in
the area; and that neighbors were close by. None of the responses
answered her question. I suspect that the reason was that an honest
answer was very unpleasant. No one was comfortable saying that,
absent the means for her resistance, the hypothetical aggressors simply
would do whatever they wished until someone came along with the
physical means to stop them.
It is possible to consider individual arms useful against threats that
range far beyond the robber, rapist or murderer. It is practically de
rigueurfor Second Amendment scholars to refer to the role of citizens
armed with their individual weapons during World War 11.157 A
156. The weakest and meekest among us have been worst served by efforts to
discourage or delegitimize weapons ownership They are the most likely victims of
violent aggression and may be the least likely to possess the assertiveness to purchase a
weapon, to carry it, or to persevere through the process of obtaining a permit for legal
carry. See David Kopel, Kopel's Comment, GUN WORLD, Nov. 1990, at 27 (describing the
service provided by ex-policeman Stephen D'Andrilli, assisting citizens through the
highly cumbersome process of obtaining a license to carry a concealed weapon in New
York City. The license costs 300 dollars. The service costs 2,500 dollars. Among the
listed licensees are Arthur 0. Sulzberger and Donald Trump). We also might expect these
same individuals to be at the very end of the line for allocation of the precious collective
security services on which they would be totally reliant.
On the other side, it may be the elite among us who would benefit disproportionately
from limiting available tools of violence to contact weapons. They may be the best able
to monitor and control their personal space.
157. See, e.g., Gardiner, supra note 92, at 82-83 (citing OFFICE OF THE ASST. SEC'Y
OF DEFENSE, U.S. HOME DEFENSE FORCES STUDY 32, 34 (March 1981)).

In the Second World War, moreover, unorganized militia proved a successful
substitute for the National Guard, which was federalized and activated for overseas
duty. Members of the unorganized militia, many of whom belonged to gun clubs
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recent district court decision also supports the view that individual
158
marksmanship is an important skill even in the nuclear age.
One commentator has argued that the possession of arms by
southern blacks during the civil rights movement gave civil rights
workers
the necessary confidence to overcome the threats, harassment, burning
crosses and sniper shots to which they were frequently subjected. In order
to survive and to realize a measurable degree of personal dignity the
Southern blacks needed the guns. As a protection, it made it easier to
organize and to insist on the exercise of their constitutional rights to vote
and speak. 15 9

One can roundly criticize the presumption, easy to find in modern
commentary, 160 that the immense power wielded by the state renders
individual arms useless in resisting abuse of collective power. 161 There

and whose ages varied form 16 to 65 served without pay and provided their own
arms. In fact, it was necessary for the members of the unorganized militia to
provide their own arms since the U.S. government not only could not supply
sufficient arms to the militia but 'turned out to be an Indian giver' by recalling
rifles. The 15,000 volunteer Maryland Minute Men brought their own rifles,
shotguns and pistols to musters. And all over the country individuals armed
themselves in anticipation of threatened invasion. Thus a manual distributed en
masse by the War Department, recommended the keeping of "weapons which a
guerilla in civilian cloths can carry without attracting attention. They must be
easily portable and easily concealed. First among these is the pistol."
Id. See also Gottlieb, supra note 131, at 138.
158. Gavett v. Alexander, 447 F. Supp. 1035, 1046-48 (D.D.C. 1979).
159. Jonathan A. Weiss, A Reply to Advocates of Gun Control Law, 52 J. URB. L.
577, 583 (1974). See also Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond, The Second
Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991).
160. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 37.
161. Wendy Brown's analysis presumes this. Id. This ignores the dynamics of
conflict, particularly the use of force by a state against its own citizens. See, e.g., DAVID
T. HARDY, THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A RESTRAINT ON STATE AND FEDERAL FIREARM
RESTRICTIONS, RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 184, 185 (D.
Kates ed., 1979).
A general may have pipe dreams of a sudden and peaceful takeover and a nation
moving confidently forward, united under his direction. But the realistic general
will remember the actual fruits of civil war-shattered cities like Hue, Beirut, and
Belfast, devastated countrysides like the Mekong Delta, Cyprus and southern
Lebanon. At such cost, will his officers and men accept it? Moreover, he and they
must also evaluate its effect in leaving the country vulnerable to foreign invasion.
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are numerous contemporary examples that illustrate the continuing
162
utility of individual arms against such power.
C. Threats
Recognizing the flexible and evolving nature of the Constitution, it is
important to consider whether real threats now exist against which
individual arms properly might be used. It is possible, taking a
decidedly urban view of America, to assume that the utility of individual
firearms has been eliminated, as the United States no longer shares a
frontier with aboriginal inhabitants who are resisting incursions
violently. Nonetheless, there are people, particularly in rural areas, who
view guns as important tools. 16 3 This daily practical utility aside, it may
Because it leads any prospective dictator to think through such questions, the
individual, anonymous ownership of firearms is still a deterrent today to the
despotism it was originally intended to obviate. [While our government has a]
quite good record of exerting power without abusing it, the deterrent effect of an
armed citizenry is one little recognized factor that may have contributed to this. In
the words of the late Senator Hubert Humphrey: "The right of citizens to bear arms
is just one more guarantee against arbitrary government, one more safe-guard
against a tyranny which now appears remote in America but which historically
has proved to be always possible."
Id.
The issue here is not necessarily one of armed citizens' ability to rise up as an
organized force to thwart tyranny. The predominant focus is whether individuals who face
immediate threats to their lives, which may or may not also jeopardize the well-being of
the community or the nation, might usefully employ their individually owned firearms to
resist those threats. One difficulty is that our debate is in large part about the future.
Structurally, the argument for an armed citizenry is similar to the debate over
environmental and other issues-viz., that it is utter foolishness to eliminate assets that
may prove useful in the future based on the naive assumption that our needs,
opportunities, and problems will remain static. See, e.g., ROBERRT A. FINDLEY AND
DANIEL A.FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4-7 (West 1985). We may then have to launch
into hypotheticals as a guide to our assessment; however, those hypotheticals require no
long stretch from existing fact.
162. See, e.g., ROBERT D. KAPLAN, SOLDIERS OF GOD (1990); Gottlieb, supra note
132, at 139 ("Anyone who claims that popular struggles are inevitably doomed to defeat
by the military technology of our century must find it literally incredible that France and
the United States suffered defeat in Viet Nam; that the Shah no longer rules Iran or Battista,
Cuba; that Portugal was expelled from Angola and Mozambique; and France from
Algeria.").
163. Many people, whose lives, interests, and views are probably marginalized in
the contemporary debate, regard firearms as useful tools, as did eighteenth and nineteenth
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be more important to consider whether the individual exposure to
violent threats that impacted the eighteenth and nineteenth century view
of individual arms ownership exists today.
On the national level, we have elevated the process of predicting
future threats to high science. 16 4 We aim to employ policy makers who
have "a vivid sense of the art of the possible."' 165 Serious people
recognize that "[t]he game of 'what if is very appropriate" 166 to
' 16 7
evaluating "the potentially hostile elements in the world around US"
as they affect security issues of national concern.
There is widespread agreement that on a national level we ought to
be prepared to repel threats to our security in kind if other options fail.
Many people adopt the opposite stance when considering the issue on
an individual level. One can find few direct discussion of potential
sources of threats and mechanisms for confronting them on an
individual level, other than in off-beat publications, such as American
168
Survival Guide and specialty gun magazines.
We would be remiss if we endorsed disarmament without
considering whether individuals should have the opportunity to employ
the same structure of security analysis utilized by government. This is
especially true in light of the lack of individual control over collective
security measures and the practical impossibility that collective
measures will be tailored to the needs of individuals. As Barry Buzan
has noted, 169 "people represent, in one sense, the irreducible basic unit
to which the concept of security can be applied. Although the traditional
emphasis in International Relations has been on the security of collective
units, particularly states, individuals can be analyzed in the same
way." 170 The wide reaching model of assessing potential threats, central
century Americans. Although one might not find such individuals in downtown Manhattan
or inside the Washington beltway, their views should not be simply dismissed.
164. See generally COLIN S. GRAY, STRATEGIC STUDIES: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
(1982).
165. BRUCE K. HOLLOWAY ET AL., GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE 1980's 20 (1978). The
flip side of the "art of the possible" may be what James Payne calls the "error of
disregarding the latent." PAYNE, supra note 146, at 13.
166. HALLOWAY, supra note 165, at 25.
167. Id. at 76.
168. E.g., Staff Report, Home Defense Guns: Experts' Tips & Picks, HANDGUNS FOR
SPORT & DEFENSE, Sept. 1991, at 30.
169. BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR 18 (1983).
170. Id. Applying a similar analysis for individual threats goes a long way toward
deflating one argument against individual ownership of arms. Disarmament advocates
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to national security analysis, offers the most generous and inclusive
options for evaluating threats that might require the use of individual
171
firearms in response.
It is not difficult to set out a fairly long list of circumstances in
which the collective security preparations will be incapable of meeting
the needs and concerns of individuals. 172 The possibility of
conventional warfare on American soil is illustrative. While it is
tempting to dismiss this as unlikely, we should wonder whether it is
simple arrogance that permits us to believe we can exert force
throughout the globe and expect that we are, and somehow always will
be, immune from similar efforts by others.
During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein pledged to make the whole
world a battlefield. One may speculate on the exposure of our citizens if
efforts were made to bring the war home to America. Surely the federal
government made efforts to secure public offices, utility assets and the
like, but an effort to bring the conflict home to complacent, comfortable
Americans might well have involved more than attacks on well-guarded
public assets. It might have focused on individual citizens in the form of
random violent attacks, hostage taking or other similar activity. We can
at least argue about the usefulness of firearms in the hands of citizens
under those circumstances.
Federal lawmakers have recognized the potential inadequacy of
organized armed forces. The Militia Act 173 declares a broad category of
Americans to be members of the federal militia. These citizens are to
operate as a substitute for the army and national guard while those
forces are deployed or engaged elsewhere. If nothing else, the Act
often propose specific hypothetical threats and argue that in those particular instances an
individual weapon would not be useful. It is possible to design just as many hypotheticals
in which an individual weapon would be useful. A more thorough analysis, which would be
more consistent with the inherently imprecise nature of threat assessment, would consider
a wide range of threats rather than narrow the evaluation to the segment where an
individual weapon would not be useful.
171. My only purpose is to suggest that circumstances may exist under which
innocent individuals might desire weapons with which to defend their lives. I am not
suggesting this would be non-disruptive from a community perspective.
172. Large scale collective efforts intended to apply generically to an entire
population almost by definition exhibit the weakness of not responding precisely or
efficiently to individual needs. In other areas, we have condemned such efforts on the
ground that they impair individual freedom, and, in the economic arena, we have
complained that they stifle vital individual initiative.
173. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1988).
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validates the possibility of community controlled security forces being
inadequate. This makes problematic the argument that individuals ought
to rely exclusively on those forces as barriers against violent aggression.
An example from World War II illustrates in detail how individual
arms might be useful in thwarting domestic threats while the armed
forces are deployed elsewhere. The U.S. Home Defense Forces Study
describes instances where militia-men in Maryland and Virginia were
mobilized to detect and repel invasion forays, parachute raids and/or
sabotage. 174 These examples may relate more directly to the Second
Amendment's militia concept. As discussed earlier, 175 this analysis
focuses predominantly on individual rather than community interests,
but it is still possible that certain of the armed militia's goals may be
achieved through the actions of armed individuals confronting threats to
their individual and, coincidentally, community interests. 176
Other threats exist on a more personal level. Considering the high
probability women have of being assaulted during their lives, 177 they
may want the option of responding forcefully to such attacks.
Alternatively, there have been notable instances in our history when the
lives of individuals were devastated by collective panic. The internment
of Japanese-Americans during World War II is one such instance.
Many in the mainstream might consider the alternative of armed
resistance by such individuals useless and counterproductive. From the
perspective of the victim, the choice between submitting to such grave
depredations or fighting, even without the hope of prevailing, might
weigh out differently. Certainly, we would expect that any one of the
framers who found himself suddenly in the circumstances faced by
many Japanese internees would have chosen to fight and die rather than
submit his life and property to such an unrestrained exercise of
collective power. Indeed, the abuses that were used to rationalize the
colonies' revolt against England pale in comparison.
Our popular literature offers examples of a different stripe. In the
story of his life as a teamster and confidant of Jimmy Hoffa, Joe Franco
stated, "I heard Jimmy telling the members that he would never allow a
174. One might argue that such tactics are irrelevant in a nuclear era, however, our
recent military activities in the Middle East show that behind the lines parachute raids and
other small unit activity remain useful as warfare tactics.
175. See supra note 157.
176. Id.
177. "[A woman] is raped every six minutes, one out of three times at gunpoint or
knifepoint." Brown, supra note 37, at 665.
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black man on the highways as an over the road driver ....If a black
man ever went out on the highways in those days pulling an eighteen
wheeler, he would probably have got killed somewhere between here
and Florida." 178 Former Congressman Claude Pepper recalled in his
autobiography a situation in 1944, which provides support for an
179
individual right to armed self defense:
The race issue is a factor in nearly all elections today, but it is nothing
like it was in earlier years, including 1944 .... If I needed a reminder of
how deep the hatred of many whites toward blacks was in that year, I
received one on this trip to Florida .... In my diary I noted: "There was
[a] feeling against the governor for not letting the Negroes fall into white
hands. The local people said there had never been a trial of a Negro for
the rape of a white woman (all lynched) and they didn't want a trial now
"180

Another example illustrates that society's security apparatus may
1 81
itself be a threat to individual security. Rodney Stark's Police Riots
178. JOSEPH FRANCO AND RICHARD HAMMER, HoFFA's MAN 196 (Prentice Hall Press
1987).
179. PEPPER, supra note 52.
180. Id. at 122-23.
181. RODNEY STARK, POLICE RIOTS (1972). Early in this work, Stark presents the
common defense against police misbehavior, that "police are human. They are supposed
to be both lawyers and sociologists, as I said, but they are still human." Id. at 58 (quoting
J. Edgar Hoover).
This helps to emphasize that the inter-group tensions that may cause conflict or
violence between ordinary citizens might also emerge in interactions between citizens and
police. Stark cites numerous examples of police officers behaving in ways unbecoming to
their position in society. For example, "Los Angeles police greet each other with the old
Lucky Strike slogan: LSMFT-which they translate as 'Let's Shoot a Mother-Fucker
Tonight.' Many policemen call their night sticks and riot batons 'nigger knockers.' Nor
has it been all talk." Id. at 98. Stark notes:
In the Blace and Reiss study one of the things observers recorded were the racial
attitudes and opinions of the policemen. They did not solicit such opinions but
merely recorded what was incidentally expressed. Their field notes were classified
along a continuum .... [The authors] reported the following direct quotations to
illustrate the meaning of their categories. The following exemplify the "highly
prejudiced officer: 'These scums aren't people; they're animals in the jungle'.
Hitler had the right idea. We oughta gas these niggers-they're ruining the
country,' 'Bastard savages.' 'Maggots.' 'Filthy pigs.' 'They ougta ship them
back where they came from.' 'Buffaloes."'
Id. at 100. He further notes that police officers have been members of the John Birch
Society and the Ku Klux Klan. Id. at 159.
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details various episodes which give some Americans reason to believe
they have had and may still have much to fear from those charged with
providing collective security. The richly detailed work of Professors
Cottrol and Diamond further illustrates how threat assessment by black
182
Americans might yield a result at odds with disarmament.
Claude Pepper suggests another danger: "Roosevelt's first hundred
days in office, I am convinced, saved this country from collapse and
preserved our form of government." 183 If we consider the collapse of
our government as a possibility, then the security measures the
government currently provides cannot justify disarmament. Self help
and self protection have been a cornerstone of our civil defense system:
Civil defense as presently conceived by Federal planning authorities rests
basically upon the principle of self-protection by the individuals, group,
and community. The individual should be trained to protect himself when
an emergency arises. The family should work together as a unit in
meeting its own problems and, in the same manner, the community
should care for its needs as far as possible before requesting outside
1 84
assistance.

In the aftermath of various types of disasters the demands of the
surviving population might well outstrip available resources. 185
See also Police Realize Strides Since Days of KKK Tie, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, June 8,

1992, at 1 "Twelve years ago, when Harrisburg had only eight black policemen, a few
white officers wore Ku Klux Klan medallions on duty .... 'There is no question we were
ready to have open warfare in the police department between whites and blacks."'
One can argue that the events cited by Stark occurred in the distant past, but recent
events in Los Angeles seem to belie that argument. Some black people might argue that
the 1970's are not ancient history, that race relations, and their corresponding impact on
black interactions with police, have gotten worse.
182. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 159. See also David Kopel, Trust the People:
The Case Against Gun Control, 109 CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS 14-17 (1988).

183. PEPPER, supra note 52, at 26. Pepper notes that "[t]o... save the country from
revolution and collapse, FDR proposed to add a justice to the Court whenever a sitting
member reached age seventy and refused to retire."Id. at 57. Pepper also notes that
"Roosevelt in his third term had not assumed dictatorial powers, nor had he suspended the
Constitution, and called off elections, as his opponents had warned .
I.."
Id. at 123.
184. Id. THE ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, PUBLIC SUPPORT, MORALE,
SECURITY 55 (Industrial College of the Armed Forces ed., Washington, D.C. 1962).
185. See 3 DONALD W. MITCHELL, THE ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, CIVIL
DEFENSE: PLANNING FOR SURVIVAL AND RECOVERY (1962). In the best case scenario under

these circumstances, we all pitch in and help, sharing our resources with the less fortunate.
In the worst case, where the game is zero sum and government is impotent, we fight with
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There is in our collective defense analysis an extreme importance
placed on protecting the infrastructure. 186 Given this emphasis, we
should wonder whether under some circumstances the decision will be
made, in a mode not subject to public debate, 187 that the security of
individuals must be sacrificed in order to protect the infrastructure.
Under such circumstances total reliance on collective mechanisms
would be misplaced.
Ultimately, the debate is about the appropriate balance between
individual security and the possibility of abuse of the mechanisms that
contribute to that security. There can be disagreement about that balance;
however, it is a mistake to assume that it should be struck with
reference only to the state of the world at this particular moment. 188
one another. Somewhere in the middle is a scenario where we cooperate, but we still
encounter individuals bent on violent aggression who must be resisted with force. It is not
reasonable to believe that only one scenario is possible. Perhaps, from a communitarian
perspective, we might wish for no arms during such a time, but from an individualists'
view, and probably a Lockean one, disarmament as a communitarian measure guarding
against such a time seems repugnant.
186. See, e.g., WALTER THOMAS, GUERILLA WARFARE, CAUSE AND CONFLICT 54-59
(National Defense University, National Security Essay Series, 1981).
187. Even absent exigent circumstances, decisions about collectively controlled
security resources can be removed from public debate. In National League of Cities v.
Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court describes one impact of permitting federal
intrusion into an area of state sovereignty: "California asserted that it had been forced [by
the intrusive federal statute] to reduce its academy training program from 2080 hours to
only 960 hours, a compromise undoubtedly of substantial importance to those whose
safety and welfare may depend upon the preparedness of the California Highway Patrol."
Id. at 847.
188. If we need any contemporary proof that "things change," it is provided amply
by the recent changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which were unthinkable
only a few years earlier. Extraordinary changes need not always be positive. Certainly,
current street crime would be considered a minor problem when measured against the
oppressive cloud that could arise from a malevolent federal government.
Professor Barber summarizes the apprehension: "Because we cannot control the
future, we cannot know in advance of particular circumstances where the harm visited by
government on some individual or minority would be justified by a credible view of the
common good within the system's capacities." Barber, supra note 11, at 81. "[A]s the
Japanese detention cases illustrate, we cannot underestimate the effect that general fear and
perceptions of exigency may have on constitutional jurisprudence." Barnett, supra note
50, at 106 (commenting upon Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
An unvarnished view of our history shows that when the chips are down, when we are
in extraordinary difficulty, when our problems are extreme, or when momentum has
developed behind a certain idea, we are capable of doing tremendous damage to individuals.
It seems appropriate, therefore, that we balance the current costs of individual arms not
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It is not clear whether the threats facing citizens today are more or
less substantial than those which faced eighteenth and nineteenth century
Americans. It is possible to think the quantum of threats is lesser today.
Even so, we might conclude that the threats we currently face are still
too great to force the conclusion that individual arms are arcane, useless
mechanisms with no proper role in modem America, or that it is
acceptable to relegate individuals to spectators in conflicts, where their
lives hang in the balance.
VII.

ARMED CITIZENS-DISARMED CITIZENS: WHICH DANGER
SHOULD WE CHOOSE?

There are costs and dangers attached both to citizen disarmament
and to a policy of open access to firearms. 189 The loss of the option of
armed self-defense and criminal misuse of firearms can both result in
the death of innocent victims. In an armed society, the danger is that
guns will be criminally or negligently abused. In a disarmed society, the
danger is that criminally possessed firearms or alternative weapons will
be used by aggressors against disarmed citizens without fear of recourse
or, alternatively, that violent threats to disarmed citizens will more easily

just against their benefits during a time of immense luxury and prosperity, but also against
their individual benefits during the moments of which we will be most ashamed.
From this view we still can oppose individual ownership of arms, but we cannot do it
merely by saying that terrible things will not happen. Honesty requires an affirmative
statement that we are willing to take the chance of shameful things happening and of
disarmed people suffering, in exchange for the hope of solutions to current problems.
Our collective ability to perform even this analysis is questionable, particularly if we
believe James Payne's lament:
In their ability to make estimates of the future, political leaders may be below the
norm. In virtually all political systems around the world, rising to a position of
leadership requires a sensitivity to the immediate social and opinion "field".
Individuals with this ability to conform to their environment would seem
especially unsuited to the task of -discounting the present in order to gauge the
future accurately.
PAYNE, supra note 146, at 93.
189. The latter is proved easily by reference to firearms homicides. The former is
less subject to direct evidence, because it requires speculation about what would have
occurred if a dead victim had been armed or if a surviving victim had been unarmed.
However, justified shootings by police and citizens indicate a societal judgment that the
officer or civilian stood to lose his own life if he did not use deadly force. See Kleck, supra
note 144; Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 123.

1992]

BEYOND THE SECOND AMENDMENT

emerge from a unilaterally armed government. 190 The principles at the
foundation of a meaningful Ninth Amendment help us choose between
the respective dangers of an armed and disarmed society. 19 1
Perhaps the essential conflict at the core of the Ninth Amendment is
the tension between restricting individual autonomy for the good of the
collective and preserving the essential aspects of personal liberty.
Professor Barnett's foreword to a recent Ninth Amendment
symposium characterizes this conflict well:
A law that was within the substantive jurisdiction of Congress and
employed proper formal means might still be unconstitutional if it
violates the "rights of the people." Such a constraint assumes, of course,
that "[i]ndividuals have rights, and there are things no person or group
may do to them (without violating their rights)," an assumption that is in
harmony with the [prescription of the Declaration of Independence that
190. It is understandably easy to react in a relative vacuum to the deaths caused by
aggressors with guns. The news of death is immediate, and the images of the suffering are
graphic. It is probably normal to have difficulty balancing this against the hypothetical
threats that might require a violent defensive response. For many, such hypotheticals
may be considered un-realistic and highly improbable.
There is, however, another perspective-that of members of the population who have
endured things that are generally ignored or, incredibly, forgotten in much of mainstream
analysis. We should count the views of Blacks, Native Americans, Asians, and I am sure
there are others. Whether we like it or not, we have in this country a fairly substantial
history of unpopular minorities suffering at the hands of the community. See infra notes
199-213 and accompanying text.
The sentiment is commonly expressed that luckily we have never experienced the
type of governmental oppression and abuse that would require resort to armed resistance,
but if large numbers of whites had experienced the same treatment experienced by blacks,
even after emancipation, the popular view about the wisdom of trusting government and
the perceived danger of ceding firearms exclusively to government would be drastically
different.
191. It is not my aim here to measure quantitatively which interest is more
significant, but in an utterly nonscientific perusal of human history it is easy to conclude
that collective violence has caused immensely more human suffering than has anything
done by individuals acting solely on their own behalf. One might well believe that
because collective action permits retreat from individual accountability and responsibility
for actions that damage individual interests, it is inevitable that more individual suffering
will result from collective violence than from the accumulated actions of individuals. Even
if we assume, however, that individual and collective abuses of firearms are equal in their
ability to destroy democracy, we still might decide that apprehension about the threat of
collective force is more consistent with the framers constitutional vision-one fueled by
fear and distrust of the limited power that was exercised by federal government at that
time.
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all men are endowed with certain unalienable rights including Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness]. Such a declaration of rights need
not be religiously based. Instead it may rest in part on a view that the
respect for certain individual rights is a prerequisite for achieving the
common good; that no matter how desirable its appearance, a measure
that violated a proper conception of these rights would invariably detract
from the common good; that a respect for a proper conception of
individual rights is the only way to achieve in practice a good that is
truly common to all; that enforcing a proper conception of individual
rights was within the competence of and particularly appropriate for the
judicial branch; and, therefore, that judicial review on this ground would
1 92
enhance the substantive legitimacy of resulting legislation.

This suggests what may be fundamental in a system of limited
government: the Constitution generally and the Ninth Amendment in
particular establish that there are some things individuals cannot be
required to sacrifice for collective interests. 193 The search for these
things might begin with the idea that there is some sort of hierarchy of
human concerns that would help identify those interests which are
exempt from collective encroachment.
A preeminent human interest is the continuation of one's life. There
is a concomitant interest in some mechanism through which threats to
one's life will be averted. One can accept these as important interests
and still deny that they establish the individual ownership of firearms as
a concern of the same magnitude, but doing so requires certain
assumptions. First, one might assume that a violent individual threat
justifying an in kind response never will be experienced. Second, one
might assume that our collective security mechanisms always will be
present and effective in deterring threats. Third, one may be willing to
accept the costs of disarmament in the form of more successful
aggression against disarmed victims as the price of testing whether a
disarmed citizenry ultimately will enhance individual security. 19 4

192.

Barnett, supra note 9, at 54 (emphasis in original).

193. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that achieving order is not the only goal
sought by our Constitution. "[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not

save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.

Convenience and efficiency are not the

primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government ....

"

Immigration &

Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
194. Defenseless individuals may be required to sacrifice their lives for this
experiment.
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The first two assumptions have been addressed earlier and seem
difficult to support in light of our daily experience. 195 The third seems
to be the basis upon which any serious advocacy of individual
disarmament must rest; however, if an acceptable balance between
individual liberty and collective interests is to be maintained, the validity
of the third assumption becomes questionable.
Arguably, disarmament would require that some of us give up our
lives to assist in the collective experiment. If we accept this cost, then it
is hard to imagine any other circumstances where individual interests
could not be sacrificed to further collective concerns. That may be where
we stand. If it is, then we should express it openly and admit that we
have departed substantially from the rhetoric of sacrosanct personal
liberty and inalienable human rights that we project as an example to the
rest of the world and resurrect in our self-congratulatory rituals.
We can reach the decision to choose the dangers of an armed society
through a slightly different route. Our Constitution was designed less to
facilitate solutions to short term political and social problems and more
to protect against significant structural threats to our democratic
system.196 If we believe that significant abuse of collective power is
more likely to occur against a disarmed citizenry, then the danger of
disarmament is a structural constitutional threat. (The valiant but
crushed efforts of pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square give
us a basis on which to evaluate this question.) On the other side of the
balance is our immediate, short-term concern about gun related crime.
Considering the full damage capacity of each alternative, a disarmed
citizenry looms as much more substantial. If from this balance we still

195. See supra notes 118-88 and accompanying text.
196. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 326 ("The
[Constitution] was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages .... " ).
Firearms abuse by street criminals seems to motivate disarmament advocacy. The*
relative threat of this problem to our constitutional foundation seems minor. This is
particularly true if we believe: (1) that individual arms are of structural constitutional
importance; (2) that they serve to preserve the balance between individual and community
interests; (3) that individual security is a fundamental right; (4) that government cannot be
trusted to secure that right and has refused to affirmatively take on that legal obligation;
(5) that government itself may be the source of threat; (6) or that forced reliance on
government for personal security is repugnant to our constitutional design.
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choose disarmament, then we may be permitting current political
exigency to erode a structural constitutional support. 197

VIII.

A NATURAL RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE: THE FUNDAMENTAL
NATURE OF ARMS

A more sparsely endorsed view of the Ninth Amendment contends
that it protects certain identifiable natural rights that always have and
always will exist. 198 Several writers have advocated this view, pointing
out that decisions of the Marshall Court and early state courts illustrate
that the judiciary was obliged to enforce natural law. 199 Professor
Moore has compiled a list of decisions in which, although the Ninth
Amendment is not explicitly mentioned, the Court "enunciates that
human beings have natural rights and that these natural rights do not
emanate from the Constitution but arise from the very nature of
200
mankind."
For those who have suffered at the hands of the government, the
sentiment enunciated by the Supreme Court in the latter part of the
nineteenth century holds some appeal:
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government
beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized no such
197. There is nothing new about the idea that individuals may face their greatest
dangers from the exercise of collective power. Madison described this concept as follows:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression.
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the
invasion of the private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of
Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents ....
5 THE WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 272 (G. Hunt ed. 1904), cited in Gardiner, supra note
92, at 95.
198. Professor Barnett argues: "[b]efore the development of positivism . . .
scholars began, rather than concluded, their political and legal analysis with the
proposition that individuals had rights, often referred to as natural rights." Barnett, supra
note 50, at 102.
199. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703, 716 (1975); Sotirios A. Barber, Whither Moral Realism In Constitutional
Theory?: A Reply to Professor McConnell, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 111, 120 (1988) ("As
Robert Faulkner puts it . . . Marshall looked upon Locke's teaching 'as the private law,
and the public law, dictated by nature itself."'). See also Sherry, supra note 30, at 1157
(describing a view of fundamental law derived from the written constitution, custom, and
natural law).
200. Moore, supra note 36, at 256.
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rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens
subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of
even the most democratic depository of power, is after all but a
despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the many, of the majority, if you
20 1
choose to call it so, but it is nonetheless a despotism.

Modem commentators have criticized the natural rights view as
being unworkable. They argue that in our more heterogeneous and
complex society, there is much less opportunity for agreement on what
these natural rights are,202 and there is no principled basis on which the
judiciary can support its particular selection. 203 The fear is that a whole
panoply of "natural rights" might spring from the courts, unrestrained
by observable standards in the text of the Constitution. It may be this
fear that leads those who do not ignore the Ninth Amendment to
endorse what I have called the "deep structures" model.204
As a practical matter, some may consider the natural rights vision of
the Ninth Amendment unsatisfactory for a separate reason. If construed
by examining only what the framers considered to be natural rights, the
Ninth Amendment appears limited in its capacity to support rights that
impact many of our contemporary debates. Stated more cynically, this
view might give little support to emerging rights that veer substantially
from our constitutional traditions. Notwithstanding these difficulties,
and because of the limited scope of the natural rights vision, it is
instructive to evaluate the individual right to arms from this viewpoint.
The intellectuals that influenced the thought of the revolutionary
period provide a broad base of support. The works of Locke 205 and
201. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 655, 662 (1874).
202. The gun debate may be the epitome of this type of disagreement and may be
generated largely by drastic differences between urban and rural cultures. See supra notes
63-67. It is also possible, however, that there is broad consensus about the legitimacy of
individual possession of firearms. That consensus probably disintegrates once the issue
moves from whether each of us wants the option of owning a gun, to whether we are
comfortable with everyone else in society having the same option.
203. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 155. See also Robert Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971) ("[T]here is no principled
way to prefer any claimed human value to any other. The judge must stick close to the text
and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights.").
204. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
205. See examples cited in Moore, supra note 36, at 227-38. Professor Moore lists
several noted historians, including Carl Becker, who contend that the political
philosophy of John Locke is at the foundation of the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, and the framers' other expressions of the appropriate relationship between
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Blackstone 20 6 explicitly support the absolute and natural right of
freemen to bear arms in self-defense. Although subscribing to a
different philosophy, 207 Thomas Hobbes advocated a right to take up
arms in self-defense as "the [sum] of the Right of Nature. ' 208 The
vision is also reflected in English common law. 20 9 These ideas can be
traced back to the writings of ancient Roman philosophers, whose work
citizens and government. Id. at 237-46. Given Locke's direct endorsement of a natural
right to arms for self-defense, there is good reason to consider that right one of the natural
rights protected by the Ninth Amendment. See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
Professor Barnett notes:
The proper connection between natural rights and constitutional analysis is that
the "historical Constitution" that judges are called upon to interpret may be seen
most accurately as a product of Lockean philosophy. Even if a contemporary
analyst did not believe in natural rights, for the Constitution to be given its
historically proper construction, such rights must be hypothesized and assumed to
exist.
Barnett, supra note 50, at 154. But see Arnold, supra note 86, at 267.
206. Hardy, supra note 110, at 54 (citing I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF ENGLAND * 143-44 (1766)). Blackstone describes the individual right to arms as
deriving from "the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of
society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression." Id. (citing
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND * 143-44 (1766)).
207. David Hardy argues that casting Hobbes as an advocate of absolute monarchy
is "not entirely fair: Hobbes in fact admits that his sovereign can be a democratic
government ...." Hardy, Historiography,supra note 26, at 31.
208. HOBBES, supra note 57, at 107.
209. Dowlut and Knoop cite, among others, Sir Michael Foster, Judge of the Court
of Kings Bench and Recorder of Bristol who wrote:
The right of self-defence in these cases is founded in the law of nature, and is not,
nor can be, superseded by any law of society. For before societies were formed,
(one may conceive of such a state of things though it is difficult to fix the period
when civil societies were formed) I say before societies were formed for mutual
defence and preservation, the right of self-defence resided in individuals; it could
not reside elsewhere, and since in cases of necessity, individuals incorporated into
society cannot resort for protection to the law of the society, that law with great
propriety and strict justice considereth them, as still, in that instance, under the
protection of the law of nature.
Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 123, at 183 (citation omitted).
See also Gottlieb, supra note 132, at 127. Gottlieb argues that colonial Americans
depended on the noted English commentators for their knowledge of fundamental common
law principles. "From Sir Edward Coke they learned that one of those fundamental
principles was the individuals right to possess arms for defense of his home and family."
Id. (citing EDWARD COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 161-62

(5th ed. Oxford, 1671)).
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"clearly influenced ... the architects of the Bill of Rights."' 210 One
scholar
contemporary writer points out that a thirteenth century English
211
grounded a right to arms for self-defense in biblical scripture.
The idea of discernable natural rights is not foreign to modem
thinkers. One state court decision describes the right to armed selfdefense as existing "[f]rom time immemorial. ' ' 212 Perhaps belying the
notion that there is no group of natural human rights that we all might
agree on, the United Nations Charter declares "nothing in the charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self2 13
defense."
I have included here only a sampling of the support for viewing
arms for self-defense as a natural right. The wide range of support in
part emanates from a fundamental and universal human interest in selfpreservation. One can acknowledge this interest and still, considering
the interests of the community as a whole, reject an individual right to
arms.
The natural law structure, however, takes an individualist focus and
considers there to be no community interest superior to certain natural
individual rights. Under a natural rights view of the Ninth Amendment,
then, we may find it difficult to reject an individual right to arms and
still conclude that the Amendment protects rights derived from human
interests less substantial than self-preservation.
IX.

WE MAY RECOGNIZE A NINTH AMENDMENT RIGHT ONLY

WHEN WE TREAD ON IT: INDICATIONS ABOUT INDIVIDUAL ARMS

The opinions of lawyers, judges, and legal scholars may have only a
superficial impact on the ultimate influence of the Ninth Amendment.
210.

Richard Gardiner offers the work of Cicero. Gardiner, supra note 92, at 66

(citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, LIVING THOUGHTS 42 (J. Dewey, ed., 1963) (noting its

inclusion in Jefferson's list of "elementary books of public right.")).
211. Caplan, supra note 27, at 804-05 n.97. Caplan notes that thirteenth century
English scholar Henry de Bracton's endorsement of a fundamental right to bear arms for
self-defense is grounded in part on Luke 11:21. Id.
212. Levin, supra note 82, at 161 (quoting Pierce v. State, 275 P. 393, 397 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1929)).
213. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, cited in James Whisker, Historical Development
and Subsequent Erosion of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 171, 182
(1976). Professor Whisker argues that the United Nations declarations of basic individual
rights is an appropriate starting point for a contemporary search for the natural rights of
free men.
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Because of its open-endedness 2 14 and arguable natural law
foundations, 2 15 the Ninth Amendment may simply confirm certain
truths already presumed by citizens. Perhaps in spite of what Congress
decrees, the Supreme Court says, or the tide of popular will dictates,
there are certain rights individuals can identify by looking into the core
of their being. It may be sufficient if that search tells them that it is
ludicrous to rely on government to protect them and to accept the danger
of that protection arriving too late as the necessary price for order.
Certain rights, as many commentators have noted, withstand the
force of popular and political opposition. Hamilton, in response to the
Tory argument that New Yorkers had no charter rights, because they
had no charter, declared: "[t]he Sacred Rights of Mankind are not to be
rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are
written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole record of human nature, by the
Hand of the Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by
mortal power." 2 16 Some measure of this sentiment has surfaced in
contemporary Ninth Amendment commentary. Professor Grey, in his
defense of an unwritten constitution, urges that an ideal picture of a
republic would not rely on elderly men in black robes or experts but
rather on ordinary citizens to make basic decisions about public morality
17
and justice. 2
Professor Sager assists the argument. He contends that "[tihe
unenumerated rights memorialized by the Ninth Amendment might be
just what they seem to be-personal constitutional rights which enjoy
218
the status of positive law-yet not be enforceable by the judiciary."
214. "[Olpen endedness is part of the very logic of [the Ninth Amendment]."
Barber, supra note 11, at 80.
215. See supra notes 199-213 and accompanying text.
216. CLINTON ROSSITER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 107
(1963) (quotation in original without citation).
217. Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 211, 237 (1988).
218. Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First,Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead
the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do With the Ninth Amendment? 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 239, 251 (1988). See also Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of
Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 100 (1988) (suggesting that we
might at once say "that there are principles of natural right [but fail to believe that] judges
have the immediate power to enforce them"). Professor McConnell uses the constitutional
dilemma of slavery to illustrate his point. He notes that while natural law declared all men
equal, the Constitution permitted slavery. He suggests that the resolution of the problem
was in the conviction, embodied in the Declaration of Independence, that men were created
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Hobbes argued that the right to defense of self cannot be surrendered; it
is indefeasible. From this sentiment, one might begin to understand
statements by some gun owners concerning increasing restrictions on
access to firearms. 2 19 One doubts that they have read Hobbes
extensively. Perhaps his description of arms as a natural right is telling
in that people do not have to read Hobbes to conclude that there is
something fundamental about owning firearms to defend their lives.
Maybe it is the citizenry itself that must validate unenumerated
rights. Perhaps these rights can only be truly identified when their
violation generates such resistance that government is forced to stand
down. The question may then settle on whether possession of arms is
an individual interest that large numbers of ordinary citizens simply will
not sacrifice regardless of legislative commands.
There is a small but growing body of information that moves
toward answering this question. I hope to avoid the statistical battle that
plagues the popular gun debate but the broad implications of available
data tells us something about how an individual right to arms fits within
an analysis which emphasizes the extrajudicial impact of the Ninth
Amendment. The indications are that many gun owners are resisting or
refusing to comply with registration and confiscation efforts that apply
to firearms already in their possession. Several studies indicate that "the
rate of defiance of Chicago's registration law is over two-thirds. In
Cleveland the rate of compliance with their handgun registration law is
estimated at less than 12 percent." 220 The efforts of several states to ban
equal. This was set forth as a maxim for a free society-a guide for future decision-making
and eventually to correction of the Constitution.
If one accepts Professor Sager's view and also concludes that the Ninth Amendment
declares personal rights to be essential and indefeasible, then its very existence might be
the only conceptual foundation necessary to justify resistance to legislation that impairs
an arguably protected right. This may be precisely what has happened. In instances of
wide scale noncompliance with confiscation or registration laws, we are seeing this
phenomenon occur. See Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45
S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972); Marbut, Fully Informed Jury Amendments: the Final
Peaceable Barrier to Gun Confiscation, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, Jan. 1991, at 76 (arguing
that juries might validly ignore what they perceive to be an unjust law and disregard
judges' jury instructions.).
219. One T-shirt slogan reads "Make all the Laws You Want. You Ain't Gettin
Mine."
220. Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 123, at 230 n.247. The authors also cite a report
from 1981 that up to 90% of American citizens believed there to be a constitutional right
to possess arms. Id.
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the possession of certain high capacity semiautomatic rifles has
produced similar rates of noncompliance. 2 2 1 Many people who
embrace the bumper sticker sentiment "you can take my gun when you
pry my cold dead fingers from around it," are apparently serious. Such
visceral oppositional rhetoric and the trend of defiance to confiscatory
legislation may be signals of protected Ninth Amendment interests.
X. THE INFLUENCE OF ELITISM AND CULTURAL BIAS ON THE

FIREARMS DEBATE

A.

Elitism

Although the reality may be otherwise, our political and
constitutional rhetoric presumes we proceed on an egalitarian basis. At
least in our collective statements and guiding public documents, we
express disdain toward elitist currents that may inevitably influence our
social and political arrangements. Therefore, fairly or not, I presume that
we would be disturbed to find elitism as one of the forces propelling
disarmament advocacy.
The starting point is the willingness of some advocates to place the
means for exerting force solely in the hands of government. We might
ask whether access to weapons by the social/political elite would be
greater than that of the average citizen. The politically powerful might be
assigned armed security escorts from the public payroll or enjoy the
benefit of plans for extravagant measures to be taken in the event of
large scale threats. 222 We also should consider whether general
221. David Kopel, Kopel's Komment: Politics & Truth, GUN WORLD, July 1991, at
32, 33. See also AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1991, at 12; David Kopel, Trust the People: The Case
Against Gun Control, CATO INST.POL'Y ANALYSIS, No. 109, July 11, 1988, at 14-17. One

report states that:
[l]ast year, California passed a ban on so-called semi-automatic assault
weapons ....

Of the approximately 300,000 assault weapon owners in the state,

less than ten percent registered ....

Some of the guns were moved to Nevada ....

Some of the guns may have been buried ...

And some ...

belong to members of

groups [that encourage resistance to gun registration].
Id.
222. As a child, I was fascinated to learn that not far from my home in the West
Virginia mountains there was a security shelter designed for the President or other public
officials to seek safety during an attack on the United States. Later, I learned that the
provisions made for citizens in the town were somewhat less elaborate. See also The
Doomsday Blueprints, TIME, Aug. 10, 1992, at 32.
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disarmament would eliminate access by the wealthy to licensed, armed
security services. This type of regulated armed force might stand as an
exception to general commands of disarmament. The problem is that
celebrity status is not a prerequisite to victimization. The victims of
violent aggression are predominantly ordinary citizens who have access
only to generic police services. Drawing an inference from the
experiences of the less fortunate of us in receiving other publicly
administered resources, it is reasonable to expect that those same
individuals will receive the very worst of the publicly administered
223
security services.
The general fairness of providing less than superlative public
services in the area of public charity might be debated. It is an altogether
different matter, and a situation much harder to justify, where
individuals are stripped of their best mechanisms of self-protection, 224
forced to rely on collective resources they have reasons to mistrust, and
then are relegated to inadequate, inefficient, or malevolent administration
of those resources. 225
Unless we are prepared to administer publicly controlled security
resources on a completely equal basis, we may be moving in a direction
223. For those people who are the last to see public water and sewer, the last to
have their roads paved or their potholes filled, it might be difficult to accept that one of
the most important and demanded government services will be provided fairly and
equitably.
224. Some effort has been made to discount the usefulness of guns by individual
citizens. A New York Times editorial has argued that most civilians are likely to lack the
training and alertness required to use a gun to stop a criminal. The Real Politics of Guns,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1983, at A30. The actual instances of civilian use of deadly force belie
this claim. See id. section E (2). See also Kleck, supra note 144.
225. The aim here is not to vilify police agencies; rather, it is simply to elicit
recognition that the factors which impact personal interactions also creep into the
administration of public resources. There may be no way to know for sure whether police
resources respond more vigorously to certain types of people. Minorities in many venues
certainly have claimed that they receive less efficient service than they perceive is given
to those in the majority. Our very recent history broadly confirms the view that many
people in this country have good reasons to believe that the collective security resources
are as likely to be used unlawfully and violently against them as in their service. See supra
note 61.
We should not be surprised that some may fear prejudice and bigotry in those
entrusted with administering collective security resources. There is nothing special about
police that makes them as a group immune from common character warts. Consequently, it
is difficult to conclude we have reached the stage where it is viable for the citizenry to
believe public security resources will be administered fairly, without malice.
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that is repugnant to our social and political rhetoric. Perhaps we really
do believe that some lives are more important than others, but if we
acknowledge this, then we may cut away at the foundation of our
political system. This dilemma exposes the importance of individual
access to arms and, concurrently, the latent currents of elitism that
should make us uncomfortable when we consider how disarmament
would be implemented.
One's willingness to surrender firearms to government probably
depends on one's general perception of the accountability and
responsiveness of government. The social, political, and economic elite
may have realistic expectations of substantially impacting public policy,
and they are the least likely to fear collective power turned against them.
They might fairly consider government to be trustworthy, benevolent,
and directed in the pursuit of their interests. For those with historic and
continuing grievances against the government, 226 however, reliance on
the good-faith administration of collective security resources may be an
unwise leap of faith.
Other elitist or classist currents in the debate are more disparate.
Wendy Brown's response to Sanford Levinson is one instance of
stereotyping gun owners and dismissing any arguments supporting
individual firearms ownership by personifying gun owners or advocates
in condescending, pejorative terms. 227 A measure of elitism, or perhaps
226. One grievance has been expressed as follows:
You would think, with a history such as ours, that we [blacks] would have
understood two things: first, that the government, while we need it, ultimately
cannot be our friend, and also that we don't need it to be our friend, really ....
Most of our history has been in relationship to a government that has not been
very kind ....
Ironically, although the Civil Rights movement came out of the
South, it began to take on the Northern view of the state as being a benevolent
institution. It isn't. It can't be, ultimately.
Moyers, supra note 52, at 137 (quoting Ann Wortham).
227. Brown states:
I want to conclude with a story, yet another way of mapping our differences as
citizens in relationship to this Amendment [the Second Amendment]. Last
summer I came out of a week long trek in the Sierra Nevadas to discover that the
car my friends and I had parked at the trailhead would not start. Still deep in the
wilderness, thirty miles from a paved road or gas station, I was thrilled to see
signs of human life in a nearby Winnebago. These life signs turned out to be a
California sportsman making his way through a case of beer, flipping through the
pages of a porn magazine, and preparing to survey the area for his hunting club in
anticipation of the opening of deer season. Not feeling particularly
discriminating, I enlisted his aid. While his buddy and my three looked on,
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hypocrisy, is exposed by one Second Amendment commentator who
lists notable and influential gun prohibition advocates who themselves
228
have obtained rare New York City permits to carry a handgun.
Another aspect of the phenomenon arises as a corollary to an
observation made by Judge Bork in assessing the uneven development
of First Amendment jurisprudence as compared with other
amendments. 229 Bork argues that the First Amendment has received an
inordinate amount of attention because of its predominant importance to
the intellectual elite, who shape constitutional jurisprudence and public
policy. 230 An individual right to arms probably ranks fairly low among

together we began working on getting the car started, a project that consumed our
attention and combined sets of tools for the next two hours.
In the course of our work, there was time to reflect upon much in our
happenstance partnership. My rescuer was wearing a cap with the words "NRA
freedom" inscribed on it. This was, I thought at the time perfectly counterpoised
to the injunction "Resist Illegitimate Authority" springing from my tee shirt.
The slogans our bodies bore appeared to mark with elegant economy our
attachment to opposite ends of the political and cultural universe-he preparing
to shoot the wildlife I came to revere, he living out of his satellite-dished
Winnebago and me out of my dusty backpack, he sustained by his guns and beer,
me by my Nietzsche and trail mix.
Brown, supra note 37, at 666
It is not at all clear that the 70 million owners of the approximately 160 million guns
in America fit Brown's stereotype. Indeed, it is fair to assume that at least some of these
gun owners are women.
228. See Kates, OriginalMeaning, supra note 2, at 208.
229. Judge Bork argues:
Many observers have suggested that much in the modern political life is
explicable by the recent enormous growth in size of the intellectual class-e.g.,
academics, journalists, lawyers etc., whose jobs center on ideas and words-and
the apparent affinity of that class for expansions of the public sector at the
expense of the private sector. This hypothesis says more than that intellectuals
are indispensable to the making and implementation of policy; it states that
intellectuals as a class have distinctive interests and tastes and are
disproportionately able to move law in the direction of their interests and tastes.
Their preference for government economic regulation is attributed to a desire
to shift power and prestige from the business class to themselves. If this
hypothesis were to some degree accurate, one would expect to see the law become
less restrictive where it impinges on the intellectual class interest. Freedom of
speech is of course the sine qua non of an intellectual class.
ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 423-24 (1978). See also Rapaczynski, supra note
12, at 183.
230. Id.
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the hierarchy of concerns of the intellectual elite. 23 1 It is, therefore, not
surprising to find support for the right coming from outside the
mainstream and a paucity of Supreme Court decisions on the issue.
In the mid 1970's, some charged that recommendations made by
the Eisenhower Commission were elitist. The commission's
recommendation to limit access to individual arms was considered by
one critic to "reflect the commission's privileged white intellectual
membership and their elitist disregard for those who cannot afford to
move to 'safe' neighborhoods or the high security apartment
232
buildings.
If we acknowledge Sheldon Wolin's indictment that every one of
our primary institutions is "fundamentally elitist in character, '233 then
we should not be surprised to find currents of elitism influencing the
debate over individual arms. If, however, we cling to the mast of
egalitarianism, then these currents should give us reason to pause as the
debate develops.
B. Culturalbias
A surprisingly unchallenged theme runs throughout the traditional
Second Amendment debate. It is illustrated in this observation:
While our government has quite a good record of exerting power without
abusing it, the deterrent effect of an armed citizenry is one little
recognized factor that may have contributed to this. The right of citizens
to bear arms is just one more guarantee against tyranny which now
appears remote in America, but which historically had proved always to
234
be possible.

The experience of minorities in this country offers a broad base for
rejecting the sentiment that "our government has had a good record of
exerting power without abusing it."' 235 It might be difficult for many in
the majority to imagine circumstances of governmental abuse of power
231. Professor Levinson observes that those who consider the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments of preeminent importance, might consider the Second Amendment a
blind alley. Interestingly, he also lists the Ninth Amendment as likely to be revered by
individuals who would ignore the Second Amendment. Levinson, supra note 2, at 638.
232. Kates, supra note 154, at 30.
233. Moyers, supra note 52, at 101.
234. Gottlieb, supra note 132, at 140.
235. Id.
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so severe as to justify armed resistance. From a minority perspective
such abuse of power is much easier to contemplate, and the idea that
police agencies make self-help superfluous seems rather quaint.
The point can be made another way. There is now some agreement
that slavery and de jure racism against blacks and certain collective
efforts against native Americans were shameful, but the tragedy and
pain of these things has not influenced our national culture as deeply as
one might expect. If our dominant culture were shaped less by the
conquerors and more by the conquered, American society might have a
vastly different view about collective power and the dangers of
despotism and oppression within the American constitutional design.
From this perspective, it is easier to believe that our society might
experience vast changes, including unpleasant ones. For those who still
live under the cloud of government-sponsored racism, the proposition
that Americans have not experienced substantial abuses of collective
power is laughable. A minority perspective may foster a deeper
appreciation of the looming possibility of a ruthless exertion of the
2 36
collective will.

XI. LINGERING CONCERNS ABOUT DISARMAMENT AND FIREARMS
REGULATION

A. The Dangers During and Beyond the Period of Vigorous
DisarmamentEfforts.
Professor Levinson suggested that we should open this debate to
different voices, including those whose views might be discounted
because of their personal characteristics. It is then appropriate to treat
several arguments raised in part in unabashedly pro-gun venues. They
directly attack the wisdom of disarmament on the premise that it is
unworkable and disadvantages those it is intended to protect. The first
argument assumes the effort toward general disarmament is undertaken
and argues that the more compliant citizens will be at a dangerous
disadvantage until total disarmament (assuming this is possible) has
been achieved. The concern within this scenario is a variation on the
"only outlaws will have guns" theme. The argument assumes that of
the approximately 160 million guns owned by individuals in this
236. For a discussion of the minority perspective, see Cottrol & Diamond, supra
note 159.
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country, 237 some would remain in private hands, and a black market in
guns would develop. This might place compliant victims at a
disadvantage against non-compliant aggressors, who generally would
expect to encounter unarmed targets. This argument has precursors in
eighteenth century America. Robert Shalhope notes for example
Thomas Paine's comment that "the peaceable part of mankind will be
continually overrun by the vile and abandoned, while they neglect the
means of self defence. '238
Don Kates points out Cesare Beccaria's eloquent rendition of the
same position.
False is the idea of utility that sacrifices a thousand real advantages for
one imaginary or trifling inconvenience; that would take fire from men
because it bums, and water because one may drown in it; that has no
remedy for evils, except destruction. The laws that forbid the carrying of
arms are laws of such a nature. They disarm those only who are neither
inclined nor determined to commit crimes. Can it be supposed that those
who have the courage to violate the most sacred laws of humanity, the
most important of the code, will respect the less important and arbitrary
ones, which can be violated with ease and impunity, and which, if
strictly obeyed, would put an end to personal liberty-so dear to men, so
dear-to the enlightened legislator-and subject innocent persons to all the
vexations that the guilty alone ought to suffer? Such laws make things
worse for the assaulted and better for the assailants; they serve rather to
encourage than to prevent homicides, for an unarmed man may be
attacked with greater confidence than an armed man. They ought to be
designated as laws not preventive but fearful of crimes, produced by the
tumultuous impression of a few isolated facts, and not by thoughtful
consideration of the inconveniences and advantages of a universal
239
decree.
237. See Senator Edward M. Kennedy, The Handgun Crime Control Act of 1982, 10
N. Ky. L. Rv. 1, 5 n.25 (1982).
238. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 125, 129 (1986).
239. Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 2, at 233-34 (citing CESARE BECCARIA,
ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 145 (1819)). Kates introduces the Beccaria quote this way:
Although actually aimed at continuing the subordination of the peasantry, the
ostensible reason for the French arms prohibition was to reduce homicide and
other violent crime, and so was it rationalized by the French Monarchs and their
apologists. The Founders gave such arguments short shrift, believing that if a
population were actually unfit to possess arms, it was only because of the
degradation induced by subjection to the oppression and exploitation of
aristocratic and monarchical authoritarianism. For a free and virtuous people,
eighteenth-century liberalism's response, as formulated by Montesquieu and
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There is a separate aspect to this analysis that rejects a fundamental
assumption of disarmament advocacy. It suggests that disarmament
simply is not feasible and criticizes the tacit assumption that after some
interim period of serious enforcement efforts, a virtually disarmed and
safer society will exist. Disarmament advocacy must assume that once
legitimate retail sales of guns are prohibited, guns will be available only
in limited numbers through illegal importation or as illegal leftovers
from the pre-disarmament period. The reality is that banning firearms is
more like banning wheels than banning cars. 240 If our target truly is
firearms generally, rather than a few chosen models, then we should
recognize that the technology literally is centuries old. 24 1 It may be a
misstep to assume that prohibiting legitimate commercial manufacture
of such weapons will make them disappear.
B. Dubious Logic: What CriminalsChoose
One thing that contributes to perceptions that general disarmament is
the ultimate result even of current gun control efforts is the rationale
behind them. The primary focus has been on restricting access to the

Beccaria, to the crime control argument was simply an expansive rhetorical
rendition of today's slogan "when guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have
guns."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
240. The ease with which firearms of even the most notorious reputation can be
constructed is illustrated by the Pakistani example where workmen in crude home shops
produce copies of the infamous AK-47 and other weapons. KAPLAN, supra note 162, at 3031. For photographs of the manufacturing conditions, see K.B. Khrom, A Visit to Darra,
Pakistan: Made to Order Combat Handguns, GUNS & SURVIVAL, vol. 7, 1992, at 64-65.
We should not be surprised that such weapons can be manufactured with relative ease,
given that the technology for them was developed in the very early part of this century.
See generally EDWARD C. EZELL, THE AK47 STORY 77 (1986).
A manufacturing ban seems sensible only if one approaches it from what we might
call 'an urban mind-set, where specialization is the rule, and where, if an item cannot be
purchased, packaged and delivered, the assumption is that it cannot be obtained. In rural
America, where individuals provide more for their own needs, the concept of doing some
metal work to produce a needed tool is much less daunting.
241. In its simplest form, the firearm requires only a chambered tube and a striker.
See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 162, at 31 (describing the manufacture of .22 caliber pen
guns by native Pathans in Pakistan). To ban such rudimentary weapons, we would have to
seriously consider banning individual access to metal, sharp objects, and springs. See
also William Weir, The Guns of the Philippine Wars, GUN DIGEST 1992, at 6, 12.
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guns supposedly favored by criminals. 242 The difficulty is that there is
no reason to believe that criminals will limit themselves to particular
types of weapons. It is likely that those intent on aggression will use
whatever tools are available and will not be thwarted because their
weapon of choice is difficult to obtain.
Without much criticism of the approach, we have started to identify
and regulate "bad" guns. The approach seems strained. Ultimately, we
are concerned about guns because they can be used to kill people. This
capability is inherent in every gun, and it exposes the absurd notion that
we are going to ban only the bad ones. 243
A separate consideration whether certain of our problems stem from
the presence or availability of particular objects. In a debate where we
consider the elimination of a substance or object, it is proper that we
evaluate not just the impact of abuse of that item, but also the level of
that abuse relative to its overall presence and appropriate use. It is
useful, then, to consider the level of abuse of firearms relative to their
total numbers. In a 1982 article describing a legislative effort to control
handgun sales, Senator Edward Kennedy offered two statistics that I
will presume to be uncontroversial. He noted that there were upwards of
164 million firearms in private hands in America. 244 He also indicated,
using information from 1979, that there were roughly 13,000 murders
and 147,000 aggravated assaults using firearms. These figures yield a

242. See Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 2, at 247. He notes that the National
Firearms Act of 1934 targeted sawed off shotguns and sub machine guns because those
were weapons of choice of the criminals of that day. The same logic is now being used to
urge an "assault rifle" ban. The touchstone is weapons chosen by criminals. There is
nothing to restrain what weapons criminals will choose. If semiautomatics are banned, it
is unlikely that criminals will give up crime. They will obtain the same guns on the black
market, or they will simply move to more readily available legal firearms. If at some point
criminals choose revolvers, or shotguns, or other legitimate sporting firearms, then the
logic of past legislation will support banning those as well.
243. Some proposals have identified bad guns as the ones to which one might fix a
bayonet. Other than the fact that they make the weapon look more intimidating, the
presence of a bayonet, compared with the destructive power of the weapon's projectile,
seems trivial; moreover, with an appropriate bracket, any rifle will accept a bayonet.
244. See Kennedy, supra note 133. Senator Kennedy cites estimates by the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms that in 1982 Americans possessed 52 million
handguns, 59 million rifles, and 54 million shotguns.
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rate of abuse of firearms in committing murder of 0.0000625% and for
aggravated assault of 0.0009188%.245
It is not my aim to argue that these rates of abuse settle the
argument, and one might strongly criticize an effort to relegate the loss
of innocent lives to cold statistics. But we can reasonably consider rates
of abuse in a debate where one alternative is to deem the mere existence
of certain instruments as a predominant cause of a problem. Whether
we admit it or not, we often make similar choices about societal costs.
We plainly do not move directly from the observation that an object or
practice causes death or suffering to the conclusion to ban it. 246 If we
believe that all activity has risks and costs, and that some segment of
our population will abuse almost anything, then it seems essential that
we consider levels of abuse prior to our public decisions to eliminate
247
access to guns, alcohol, tobacco, automobiles or anything else.

245. We get more numbers in Sanford Levinson's citation to former Justice Lewis
Powell's presentation to the American Bar Association. Levinson, supra note 2, at 655.
Powell noted that between 1986 and 1987 there were 40,000 murders in the United States.
(To the degree that the number of weapons owned by Americans and the level of criminal
firearms abuse have increased, it might be instructive to consider whether their rates of
increase have been evenly matched, or show some correlation.)
Roughly 60% of the 40,000 murders were committed with firearms. In comparison to
the total number of guns, call it 160 million, that is a percentage of abuse (.00015%) we
should achieve in other aspects of our public policy. The comparison does absolutely
nothing to minimize the deaths, but it does say something about the capability of the
population at large to possess and use firearms responsibly. It is still true that the
overwhelming majority of the tens of millions of American gun owners are honest,
normal people whom we might even like and trust. As we debate disarmament, we ought to
consider that it is not one exclusively between the NRA and Handgun Control Inc. It
concerns and is impacted by the large number of citizens who have purchased firearms for
sport or protection, but who (perhaps because it is not politically correct in some circles
to own weapons, let alone advocate their free and open ownership) keep their status as gun
owners locked in the closet like a dirty secret. As the debate proceeds, we may understand
that a vision of gun owners as poorly educated kooks, sexists and bigots, is contradicted
by the diversity within the millions of gun owners who might not even think of joining
the NRA.
246. Our debate over abortion shows that we are deeply troubled by eliminating a
fetus that depends on its mother for life, but, so far, we still condone the abortions because
of countervailing concerns.
247. This justification is weakened when we consider that virtually the entire
population of owners of a device have not abused the item.
One wonders whether the social benefit of alcohol is justified by the toll it takes in
death, illness and family tragedy. This balance is worth inquiry, given that alcohol
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CONCLUSION AND AN INVITATION TO A REVEALING
COMPARISON

The Ninth Amendment has been suggested as support for a right to
engage in sodomy, a right to wear long hair, protection against
imprisonment in maximum security, a right to transport lewd materials
in interstate commerce, a right to a healthful environment, 248 and
affirmative rights to government services. 249 It will be revealing to
examine whether we can comfortably support such rights and at the
same time oppose a right to arms for self-defense.
My guess is that in each instance, we will gain something by
scrupulously evaluating what allows us to reach divergent
conclusions. 250 I suspect that in many instances the honest answer will
consumption is an incident of luxury while arms possession may be of utility in
preserving both life and liberty.
The unfortunate aspect of this is that one must then get into the statistical game and
its inbred dishonesty. I have largely refrained from drawing conclusions based on
statistics from any source. I will continue that effort here. My point is not that there is a
better basis for banning alcohol than banning guns, but, proceeding rationally, a
comparison between the two should be made in contemplation of a ban on the latter.
It is interesting that outside of obscure references in gun magazines, there is no one
seriously raising this argument. It seems in the popular press a foregone conclusion that
outside the arcane act of hunting, weapons have no utility in modem America.
248. Raoul Berger lists these among other examples where litigants have attempted
to invoke the Ninth Amendment to assert inherent rights. Raoul Berger, The Ninth
Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1980).
249. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 11, at 83 n.50. This style of right is
representative of other possibilities. It is distinct from "traditional" constitutional rights
in that it urges government to act affirmatively rather than refrain from certain other
actions.
250. Our current constitutional debate offers a stark example of the difficult
questions that arise from a comparison of the unenumerated rights we are willing and
unwilling to endorse. I am referring to the abortion debate and suggesting a comparison
between that controversial right and a Ninth Amendment individual right to arms.
The right to abortion permits a woman under the rubric of privacy, to eliminate a
potential life and, arguably, a life in being. In most cases, the mother bears substantial
responsibility for this nascent life, and it generally is not an aggressive or immediate
threat to her life. In most cases, it may be very hard to argue that the mother is in any way
the victim of the fetus.
A fair comparison certainly might rank the interest in self-defense against violent
aggression equally or more highly than the right to avoid a pregnancy that will disrupt or
reduce the quality of one's life. Exactly this hierarchy appears in the abortion debate.
Even those who would deny a woman's right to an abortion on demand seem to
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be that the respective positions are influenced less by objective analysis
(to the degree there is such a thing) than by political allegiances and
what is considered politically appropriate, enlightened, progressive, or
trendy. To the degree that this is so, we probably are the worse for it.
More importantly, we are faced with the unfortunate possibility that we
cannot implement the Ninth Amendment in a way that is even
superficially fair.

acknowledge the legitimacy of abortion if required to save the life of the mother. Even this
conservative position is arguably more extreme than a right to use deadly force against a
wrongful aggressor. By comparison, even in life threatening cases the fetus is wholly
innocent and nonaggressive. Arguably, the mother has a greater duty to the fetus than any
gun owner has to other members of society who may be killed or injured due to the
availability of guns.
Another example stems from the admirable work of Professor Tribe. In Bowers v.
Hardwick, 474 U.S. 943 (1985), Professor Tribe argued that the Ninth Amendment should
be construed to invalidate Georgia's sodomy law. I would hazard a guess that the natural
law support, historical and philosophical arguments, and other support for an individual
right to arms are at least as substantial as the support for the right to engage in sodomy.
See also Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth
Amendment's Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & POL. 63 (noting that Professor Tribe argued
broadly from the textual guarantee of liberty against such a pervasive intrusion on the
person). Many of the convictions that would have us believe government's power ought
not extend into one's private sexual activity may aid the argument that government
cannot legitimately force citizens to rely on collective measures for personal security.

